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JOHNNY CAN'T READ 'CAUSE JANE'S GOT A
GUN: THE EFFECTS OF GUNS IN SCHOOLS, AND
OPTIONS AFTER LOPEZ
Carl W. Chamberlint
Today's American teenagers are confronted by violence more
frequent and more lethal than that faced by any other generation.' Con-
sider, for example, that every 100 hours more youths die on the streets
than were killed in 100 hours of ground war in the Persian Gulf.2
Most of them are killed by gunfire,3 and over 120 children are slain
t Of Counsel, Onick, Herrington & Sutcliffe LLP, Menlo Park, California. J.D., Uni-
versity of California, Hastings College of the Law, 1985. A. B., Stanford University, 1980.
Along with William F. Abrams, Mr. Chamberlin represented several children advocacy organi-
zations in their amicus curiae brief submitted to the United States Supreme Court in United
States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). Mr. Chamberlin is also an Adjunct Professor at the
University of California, Hastings College of the Law, and the Santa Clara University School
of Law. The views expressed herein are not necessarily the views of Orrick, Herrington &
Sutcliffe LLP or its clients.
1 In 1988-1989, American teenagers ran the greatest risk of being murdered of any
segment of the U.S. population, and teenagers between the ages of 15 and 19 suffered the
greatest increase in murder rates. See Murder Rates: Why the Recent Rise?: Hearing on the
Increase of Homicides in Our Nation Before the Senate Comm. on Judiciary, 101st Cong. 56,
67-68 (1990); Jonah Blank & Warren Cohen, Prayer Circle Murders, U.S. NEws & WORLD
REP., Dec. 15, 1997, at 24 (reporting that the number of juvenile murder victims increased
66% between 1985 and 1995). From 1986 to 1990, 10,052 children (ages 5-19) were mur-
dered with guns in America, and an additional 9,213 died from guns unintentionally dis-
charged or by suicide. See Lois A. Fingerhut, Firearm Mortality Among Children, Youth and
Young Adults 1-34 Years of Age, Trends and Current Status: United States, 1986-90, 231
ADvANcE DATA FROM VITAL AND HEALTH STATISTICS OF THE CTRS. FOR DIsEASE CONTROL
AND PREVENTION NAT'L CTR. FOR HEALT- STATIsTICS 12-15 tbl.3 (1993). According to a
report by the National Center for Health Statistics, in 1990 alone nearly 4,200 teenagers were
killed by guns. See Barbara Vobejda, Rate of Gun Deaths Rises Sharply Among 15-24 Age
Group, WASH. PosT, Mar. 24, 1993, at A4.
2 Gordon Witkin, Kids Who Kill, U.S. NEws & WORLD REp., Apr. 8, 1991, at 26, 27
(quoting Louis Sullivan, Secretary of the Dep't of Health and Human Services).
3 In 1986, 61% of homicides among boys and 32% of homicides among girls involved
firearms. See Fatal Injuries to Children-United States, 1986, Morbidity & Mortality Weekly
Reports, 264 JAMA 952 (1990). In 1990, 82% of homicides of persons 15 to 19 years old
were committed with guns. Teens and Firearms: Not Just an Inner-City Problem, Public
Health Report, March 14, 1995 (visited April 20, 1998) <http:www.hhs.gov/cgi-binwaisgat>
[hereinafter Teens and Firearms]. People between 16 and 24 are more likely to be victims of
handgun crime than any other age group. See MicHAEL R. RAND, U.S. DEP'T OF JusT., HAND-
GUN CRIME VicnAs 3 (1990).
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by guns each month.4 In fact, every 36 minutes, a child is shot.5
Much of this violence occurs in our nation's schools. Although
schools should be safe havens, equipping children with the skills and
values needed to lead society into the future, they are actually primary
locations for violence.6 In the last few months of the 1997-98 academic
year, a dozen students and teachers were killed and dozens more
wounded in shootings across the country.7 In a single incident in April
1999, two Colorado high school students killed twelve of their class-
mates and a teacher, and wounded several more.8 And these well-publi-
cized tragedies are just the tip of the iceberg. Over a third of all high
school students are regularly threatened with harm, and more than ten
percent are actually attacked.9 A surprising twenty percent of all urban
4 See Richard Price, Violence 'spreading like wildfire', USA TODAY, May 9, 1994, at
IA (reporting that 120 million American children under the age of 18 are slain by gunfire each
month, not including accidental deaths and suicides).
5 See Mary Taylor Previte, What Will They Say at My Funeral?, N.Y. Tavms, Aug. 7,
1994, at 17.
6 Approximately half of all violent crimes against youths aged 12 tol9 occur on school
property or adjacent streets. See CATHERINE J. WItAKER & LISA D. BASTIAN, U.S. DE,'T. OF
JusIcE, TEENAGE VICrimS, A NATIONAL CRiME SuRvEY REPORT (May 1991). Around 37%
of violent crimes and 81% of crimes of theft against younger teenagers occur at school. See id.
7 In Jonesboro, Arkansas, two camouflage-clad boys, aged 11 and 13, shot and killed
four classmates and a teacher, and wounded nine others on the grounds of Westside Middle
School. See Shaken Kids Huddle For Comfort, USA TODAY, Mar. 25, 1998, at 3A; Karen S.
Peterson, Society More Violent; So are Children, USA TODAY, Mar. 25, 1998 at 3A. In Ken-
tucky, a fourteen-year old freshman arrived at a high school prayer meeting with a pistol, two
shotguns, two rifles, and 700 rounds of ammunition and shot eight of his classmates, killing
three of them. See Blank & Cohen, supra note 1 at 24. In Edinboro, Pennsylvania, a 14-year
old boy shot and killed a teacher and wounded two students and another teacher at an eighth-
grade graduation dance. See Kristen Hays, 8th-Grader Held in Fatal Shooting, WASH. POST,
Apr. 26, 1998, at A3. In Pearl, Mississippi, a high school student killed two classmates and
wounded seven others. See id. At Thurston High School in Oregon, a freshman carrying three
guns opened fire in the cafeteria, killing four and wounding 20. See Timothy Egan, Shootings
in a Schoolhouse: The Overview, N.Y. TMms, May 23, 1998, at A9.
8 In April 1999, two Columbine High School students in Littleton, Colorado took guns
and bombs to school and reportedly laughed as they killed 12 students and a teacher, wounded
28 others, and then killed themselves. See Kevin Fagan et al., School Littered With Bombs,
S.F CHRON., April 22, 1999, at Al, A6. The two were purportedly obsessed with guns, death,
and violent video games. Id. The teenagers' rampage was one of the bloodiest mass killings
in our nation's history. Id. See Kevin Fagan et al., Suicide Attack Blamed on 2 Students, S.F.
CHRON., April 21, 1999, at A4.
9 A 1987 National Adolescent Student Health survey found that out of 11,000 eighth
and tenth grade students, 34% had been threatened with harm, 14% had been robbed and 13%
were attacked while they were at school or on a school bus during the previous year. See LISA
D. BASTIAN & BRUCE M. TAY LOR, U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., SCHOOL CRIME: A NATIONAL CRMIE
VICTIMIZATION SURvEY REPORT 1 (1991). In 1989, over 400,000 students aged 12 to 19 were
victims of violent crime in or around their schools within the previous six months. See id. In
1991-92, in Los Angeles public schools alone, 383 students were assaulted with deadly weap-
ons. Id. See also Everyone Should Be Scared, L.A. TMsS, Sept. 26, 1993, at El (interviews
conducted by Michael Arkush et al.); SOURCEBooK, 233, thl. 3.38 (In 1996, 13.2% of high
school seniors reported being threatened with a weapon at school).
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high school students have been threatened with guns.10 In 1993 alone,
over a third of urban school districts reported a shooting or knifing.1'
Furthermore, students are not the only ones in danger at school.
Thousands of secondary school teachers are physically attacked each
year,12 and thousands more are threatened with harm every day.' 3 A
1994 Gallup poll ranked school violence as America's primary concern
in education.14
In particular, the presence of guns in our schools has contributed
mightily-and mortally-to the violent disruption of our children's edu-
cation. On any given day, odds are good that when a teenager sits down
in an urban high school classroom, one of his or her classmates is pack-
ing a gun.' 5 In many parts of the country, schools conduct "duck-and-
cover" drills designed to prepare students for neighborhood gunfire, 16
search students with metal detectors, 17 and employ SWAT teams and
gun sniffing dogs. 18 In these and other ways, guns and gun violence
degrade the education process, 19 compromising our children's employ-
10 See J.F. Sheley et al., Gun-Related Violence In and Around Inner-City Schools, 146
Am. J. DisEAsEs Ti CHmDREN 677, 679 (1992).
11 Elizabeth Shogren, More Violence Seen in Schools Than 5 Years Ago, L.A. Tmms,
Jan. 6, 1994, at 17 (citing survey conducted by National School Boards Ass'n, which found
that 39% of responding urban school districts had reported a shooting or knifing in their
schools in 1993, and that 23% reported drive-by shootings).
12 A report to Congress revealed that approximately 5,200 teachers are physically at-
tacked monthly in our nation's secondary schools. See NAT'L INST. OF EDUC., U.S. DEP'T OF
HEALTH, EDUC. AND WELFARE, VIOLENT SCHOOLS-SAFE SCHOOLS: THE SAFE SCHOOL
STUDY REPORT TO THE CONGRESS 64 (1978) [hereinafter SAFE SCHOOL REPORT].
13 According to statistics compiled by the U.S. Dep't of Justice, each day in the United
States, 6,250 teachers are threatened with violence and 260 teachers are physically assaulted.
Charlie Weaver, When Kids Pack a Gun Instead of a Lunch, STAR TRIu., Feb. 10, 1993, at
17A.
14 See Jonathan Marshall, Beyond the Bruises-the Cost of School Violence, S.F.
CHRON., May 26, 1997, at BI.
15 See infra note 42 and accompanying text.
16 See Selected Crime Issues: Prevention and Punishment: Hearings Before the Sub-
comm. on Crime and Crim. Just. of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong. 654 (1991)
[hereinafter Prevention and Punishment] (statement of Ronald D. Stephens, Exec. Dir., Na-
tional School Safety Center, "NSSC").
17 Approximately 15% of school districts had installed metal detectors by 1994. See
School Officials Need Help To Curb Violence, Survey Says, SCHOOL LAW NEws, Jan. 14,
1994, at 4 (citing survey conducted by National School Board Ass'n). See Thomas Toch et al.,
Violence in Schools, U.S. NEws & WoRLD REP., Nov. 8, 1993, at 34, 35 (stating that approxi-
mately 45 urban public school districts had installed metal detectors as a result of school
violence).
18 See Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990: Hearings on H.R. 3757 Before the Subcomm.
on Crime of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong. 39 (1990) [hereinafter Hearings
on H.R. 3757] (statement of Barbara Lautman, Dir., Center to Prevent Handgun Violence);
William Cells 3d., Schools Getting Tough on Guns in the Classroom, N.Y. Trams, Aug. 31,
1994, at Al (explaining how schools are using dogs trained to detect guns, banning the use of
book bags and refusing to provide lockers).
19 See infra notes 48-81 and accompanying text.
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ment opportunities 2° and, ultimately, our nation's competitiveness in the
world economy.21 School gun violence also gives rise to other direct
national costs, such as medical and rehabilitation expenses, which totaled
over $33 million in 1986-1990 alone.22
Although the presence of guns in schools may be symptomatic of
deeply rooted social problems and an increasingly violent society, state
and federal governments have attempted to deter students from taking
guns to school. These efforts have focused on criminalizing gun posses-
sion on or near schools, mandating the expulsion of gun-toting students,
or penalizing parents whose children are caught with guns.23 It is un-
clear, however, whether local governments have the resources or the will
to enforce such sanctions to the extent that they will actually deter stu-
dents from carrying guns at school-especially since many students be-
lieve they need to carry a gun for status or protection from their peers.24
What is also unclear is the legality of federal regulations regarding
guns in schools, as Congress' power is much disputed in this area. In the
1995 United States v. Lopez25 decision, the Supreme Court struck down
federal legislation known as the Gun-Free School Zones Act,26 which
had prohibited the possession of a firearm within 1,000 feet of a school.
The Court held that notwithstanding the national ramifications of gun
violence in schools,27 the Act exceeded the scope of Congressional
power under the Constitution's Commerce Clause. 28 Since Lopez, Con-
gress has amended the Gun-Free School Zones Act in an effort to cure
the original statute.29 As amended, the Gun-Free School Zones Act now
prohibits the knowing possession or discharge of a firearm-that has
been in interstate commerce-within 1,000 feet of a school.30
Congress has also adopted several other measures directed at gun
violence in schools. Under its Commerce Clause power, Congress
passed a law in 1994 prohibiting the possession or purchase of handguns
by juveniles.31 Under its Spending Clause32 power, Congress enacted
the Gun-Free Schools Act of 1994,33 which conditions a state's accept-
20 See infra notes 90-91 and accompanying text.
21 See infra notes 204-209 and accompanying text.
22 See infra notes 83-89 and accompanying text.
23 See infra notes 170-178 and accompanying text.
24 See infra notes 120-141 and accompanying text.
25 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
26 18 U.S.C. § 922(q) (1995).
27 See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 563-565.
28 U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
29 18 U.S.C. § 922(q) (1999). See Gun-Free School Zones Act Amendments of 1995, S.
890, H.R. 3610, (passed as part of the Omnibus Appropriations Bill for 1997).
30 18 U.S.C. § 922(q) (1999).
31 18 U.S.C. § 922(x) (1994).
32 U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
33 Gun-Free Schools Act of 1994, 20 U.S.C. § 8921 (1994).
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ance of federal education funds on its enactment of a law requiring the
expulsion of any student who takes a gun to school. Also pursuant to its
Spending Clause power, Congress adopted the Safe Schools Act of
1994,34 which offers grants to high-crime school districts that are willing
to undertake various approaches to decreasing gun violence in schools. 35
This article considers Congress' power to regulate, and the efficacy
of various attempts to regulate, the problem of guns in schools. Part I
reviews the incidence and consequences of gun possession and gun-re-
lated violence in schools, including the effect on education and the econ-
omy. Part II discusses various approaches to curbing gun violence in
schools, and suggests that local governments, because they best under-
stand their particular communities, may best be able to devise ways to
deter students from carrying guns. Part III examines the states' tradi-
tional power to regulate school violence and the reasons that federal reg-
ulation may nonetheless be warranted. Part IV examines the power of
the federal government to curb gun violence in schools, particularly after
Lopez. The article concludes that, although the federal government may
have Commerce Clause power to regulate aspects of gun possession in
schools after Lopez, indirect regulation by conditioning federal funds to
the states under the Spending Clause will be more effective. The article
also suggests that although each of the federal government's latest legis-
lative acts addressing gun violence in schools is constitutional, Congress
should nevertheless permit state and local governments to spend federal
funds on a broader range of deterrent measures.
I. GUNS IN SCHOOLS AND THE RAMIFICATIONS FOR
EDUCATION AND THE NATIONAL ECONOMY
By 1989, there were over 200 million firearms in circulation in the
United States-almost one for every man, woman and child.36 Indeed,
many guns are in the hands of children, and gun manufacturers are now
specifically focusing on schoolchildren as a viable market.37 Juvenile
possession of guns has increased dramatically over the years, and as
34 Safe Schools Act of 1994, 20 U.S.C. §§ 5961, 5962 (1994).
35 See Goals 2000: Educate America Act, 20 U.S.C. §5802 (1994). See also infra note
367 and accompanying text.
36 See Michael Isikoff, 200 Million Guns Reported in Circulation Nationwide, WASH.
PosT, May 24, 1991, at Al (citing 1991 report of Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms,
estimating the number of firearms in circulation as of 1989).
37 See infra note 118 and accompanying text; See also United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S.
549, 603 n.* (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting). See Richard Price, Sleek, and Tempting, by
Design, USA TODAY, May 9, 1994, at 9A. (quoting Geoffrey Canada of the Rheedlen Center
for Children and Families who alleges that "[guns being manufactured today] have [mI]ore
gadgets [and].. .[m]ore bullets in the clip. It's the same thing that happened in the sneaker
industry, which keeps adding things like air pumps and little lights to attract kids.").
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more and more children take guns to school, violence increases, children
die, and the quality of education declines.
A. THE PROBLEM: GUN POSSESSION AND GuN-RELATED VIOLENCE IN
SCHOOLS
1. Guns in Schools
The juvenile arrest rate for weapons possession rose over 113% be-
tween 1985 and 1994,38 and nearly a quarter of inner-city high school
students own at least one gun.39 Not only do more school-aged children
own guns, they are taking their guns to school. According to the U.S.
Department of Justice, every day 100,000 students in the U.S. take fire-
arms to school.40 Other sources report that nearly three times that
number-approximately 270,000 guns-are taken to school daily,41 and
that one in eight urban high school students carries a gun.42
38 See FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., UNIFORM CRIME RE-
PORTS: CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES, 1995 276 (1996) [hereinafter 1995 FBI REPORTs] (vis-
ited April 25, 1998) <www.fbi.gov/ucr/crimeus.pdf>. The juvenile arrest rate for weapons
possession increased 60% between 1980 and 1990. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., UNIFoRM CRIME
REPORTS: FOR Ta UNreD STATES, 1991 289 tbl. 5.1 (1992). Although juvenile violent crime
arrests have actually declined in the past few years, they remain substantially higher than a
decade ago. See 1995 FBI REPORTS, supra note 38 at 27.
39 A survey by the National Institute of Justice of 1,600 male students in 10 inner-city
high schools found that 22% owned at least one gun. Over 80% of those who had guns had a
semi-automatic handgun. See Price, supra note 37, at 9A tbl.; See Pierre Thomas, Guns Seen
as Part of Life Among Inner-City Youths, WASH. POST, Dec. 13, 1993, at A4 tbl.
40 See Weaver, supra note 13. Hearings on H.R. 3757, supra note 18, at 37 (statement of
Sen. Arlen Specter, referring to testimony of Dewey Stokes, president of the Fraternal Order of
Police, before the House Subcommittee on Juvenile Justice, in June 1993).
41 See Toch, supra note 17, at 31-32. See also CENTER TO PREvENT HANDGUN Vio-
LENCE, CAUGHT IN THE CROSsFnE: A REPORT ON GUN VIOLENCE IN OUR NATIoN's ScHooLS 7
(1990) [hereinafter CRossFI.a] (reporting that each year, as many as 400,000 boys carry hand-
guns to school). See also BASTIAN & TAYLOR, supra note 9, at 10-12 (reporting that one-half
million students in a six-month period took a weapon to school to protect themselves).
42 See Nancy McCarthy, Children Not Escaping Tough-on-Crime Climate, CAL. B.J. 1
tbl. (July 1995) (citing study by National Institute of Justice); Cf. Recess from Violence: Mak-
ing Our Schools Safe: Hearing on S. 1125 Before the Subcomm. on Educ., Arts and Humani-
ties of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 103d Cong. 39 (1993) (statement of
Ronald D. Stephens, Exec. Dir., NSSC) (citing a Louis Harris Poll from July 1993, which
found that 15% of the teenage students surveyed had carried a handgun in the previous 30
days). In 1993, approximately one in 12 students carried a gun to school in a 30-day period.
See Todd S. Purdum, Clinton Seeks Way Around High Court's Gun Ruling, S.F. EXAM'R, Apr.
30, 1995, at A2. Other sources report that four percent of high school students and six percent
of inner-city high school students carry guns to school. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S.
549, 603 (1995) (Breyer, J., dissenting); See Teens and Firearms, supra note 3 (showing study
which found that one in four males in New Orleans suburb carries a gun). In addition, the
percentage of students carrying guns to school appears to have increased. In a national survey
in 1987, one out of every 36 tenth grade boys said they had carried a handgun to school during
the year, and one in every hundred boys took a gun to school nearly every day. Id. See Tan
NATIONAL ADOLESCENT STUmENT HEALTH SURvEY, A REPORT ON THE HEALTH OF AMERICA'S
YOUTH, tbls. 2-29 (1989); Charles M. Callahan & Frederick P. Rivara, Urban High School
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Each year more and more guns are taken to school.43 In California
public schools, the number of guns confiscated, at all grade levels-in-
cluding kindergarten through sixth grade-doubled between 1985 and
1988.44 And in 1990 alone, California schools experienced a forty per-
cent increase in the presence of firearms.45 Schools may also be becom-
ing a common place for children to actually obtain firearms. 46 Thus,
while a previous generation may have traded baseball cards at school;
many children now trade and sell guns.47
2. Guns at School Mean Death at School
The presence of guns in our schools has increased both the inci-
dence and lethality of school violence.48 Firearms are obviously more
dangerous than other weapons,49 and the wounds inflicted are accord-
ingly more severe, and often fatal.50
Because guns can engender a feeling of power and control, they
embolden students to escalate confrontation and to resolve disputes by
pulling a trigger.51 An argument between students that might before
Youth and Handguns, 267 JAMA 3038-42 (1992). A survey of students at 31 Illinois high
schools revealed that one in 20 students had carried a gun to school in 1990. See ILL. CuiJ.
JusT. INFo. Atmi., Trends & Issues 91: Education and Criminal Justice in Illinois 40 (1991).
In another city, one out of every 15 eleventh grade boys has carried a handgun to school. Toch
et al., supra note 17, at 34. See also U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., BUREAU OF JusTicE STATISTICS,
SOUcanBOOK OF CRMINAL JUSTICD STArSTiCS-1996 254, at thl. 3.53 (1997) (4.5% of high
school respondents carried a gun to school at least once in 1995-96).
43 Id.
44 See CAL. DEP'T OF EDUC., SCHOOL CRIME IN CALIFORIA FOR THE 1988-1989 SCHOOL
YEAR 1 (1990).
45 See Prevention and Punishment, supra note 16, at 656 (statement of Ronald D. Ste-
phens, Exec. Dir., NSSC). See also Blank & Cohen, supra note 1 at 24 (reporting President
Clinton's statement that "high school seniors are more likely to take weapons to school than to
take calculus in school").
46 Students who report that they could easily obtain a handgun say that they would be
more likely to get guns from friends than on the street. See Callahan & Rivara, supra note 42;
McCarthy, supra note 42.
47 Gregory Freeman, Guns in School: Deadly Issue, ST. Louis PosT-DSPATCH, Nov. 27,
1992, at 1E (reporting that in 1992, Houston school administrators discovered that a student
was running a gun rental service on campus).
48 See Hattie Ruttenberg, The Limited Promise of Public Health Methodologies To Pre-
vent Youth Violence, 103 YAI L.J. 1885, 1892 (1994) (stating that "[the recent increases in
the juvenile murder arrest rate-and, presumably, in murders by juveniles-appear inextrica-
bly linked to firearms").
49 Firearms are estimated to be between two and five times more lethal than knives. See
JAMEs D. WRirHT ET AL.., UNDER TiE GUN: WEAPONS, C~mm AND VIOL.NcE IN AmRiCA
198 (1983). They are also seven times as lethal as all other weapons combined. See U.S.
DEP'T OF JusT., UNIFoRM CRIam REPoRTS: FOR THE UNrED STATES, 1963 7 (1964).
50 Over a recent two-year period, 47 of 74 intentional deaths on school campuses in-
volved the use of firearms. NSSC, SCHOOL AssoCIATED VIoI.ENr DEATHs 7 (1994) (tracking
period from July 1, 1992 to May 26, 1994).
51 As one commentator has put it, "[a] 14-year-old armed with a gun is far more menac-
ing than a 44-year-old with a gun. While the teenager may be less schooled in using a firearm,
1999]
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have resulted in a fistfight may now be resolved by a gunfight. Children
now shoot other children for teasing them,52 or to avenge a wrong.5 3
Children execute their teachers because they were disciplined or given a
poor grade.54 Children hold their classmates and teachers at bay with
shotguns and spray classrooms with bullets.5 5 Children die when fire-
arms accidentally discharge.56 Children die for no reason at all.5 7
Shocking examples of school violence have abounded from all parts
of the country in recent years. In academic years 1986 through 1990, at
least seventy-one people-sixty-five students and six school employ-
ees-were killed by firearms at school, another 201 were severely
wounded, and 242 were held hostage at gunpoint.5 8 During this same
period, shootings or hostage situations in schools were reported in at
least thirty-five states and the District of Columbia.5 9 And in just a few
heralded incidents during the 1997-98 and 1998-99 school years, school
shootings killed more than two dozen students and teachers and wounded
he is more willing to pull the trigger." James A. Fox, Murder Most Common, BOSTON GLOBE,
Jan. 31, 1993, at 65.
52 A 15-year old Texas girl killed a classmate-the varsity football captain and junior
prom prince-in a lunch line because she thought he called her a name. See Tom Morganthau,
It's Not Just New York.. , NEwswEEK, MAR. 9, 1992, at 25. In Pennsylvania, a 15-year old
killed a tenth-grader in front of 22 students because he had been teased about his height. See
Roll Call of the Dead, PEoPLE WxLY, Jun. 14, 1993, at 51, 53.
53 At a New York high school swarming with security guards in preparation for a visit
from the mayor, a 15-year old boy shot and killed two students at point blank range, leaving
another student so distraught he went home and killed himself. See John Shanahan, Two Stu-
dents Killed in NYC High School Before Mayor's Visit, A.P., Feb. 26, 1992.
54 In Kentucky, a boy fired a fatal bullet into his teacher's temple, killed a custodian, and
held his classmates hostage because, among other reasons, he disagreed with a grade he was
given. See Jerry Buckley, The Tragedy in Room 108, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., Nov. 8,
1993, at 41, 41-42, 44. A 16-year old middle school student in Washington shot his teacher,
who had given him a grade that made him ineligible to play football. See Paula Bock et al.,
"Arms Race" in Schools-Students Say They Pack Guns for Protection, SEA=rr_ TeAms, Mar.
10, 1992, at Al.
55 See Andrea Stone, Kids, Guns: 'It's shoot or be shot', USA TODAY, Jun. 3, 1993, at
IA; Jim Abrams, From Inner Cities to Rural Heartland, Violent Start to School Year, A.P.,
Sept. 22, 1991.
56 A Chicago seventh-grader shot himself in homeroom thinking his gun was not loaded.
See Roll Call of the Dead, supra note 52, at 50. A Los Angeles tenth-grader was killed when a
.357 magnum in another student's backpack accidentally discharged. See id.
57 In a Montana elementary school, a fourth-grader shot and killed an 11-year old for no
apparent reason. See Price, supra note 4. In Tennessee, while watching a Disney movie in
class, a 14-year old killed the 13-year old seated in front of him by wrapping a jacket around
the gun in his hand and firing it into the back of the classmate's head. Id. at 5A. The 14-year
old who shot his classmates in West Peducah, Kentucky said he did not know why he did it.
Cox News Service, Victimized Towns Relive Horror of Shootings, S.F. CHRON., April 21,
1999, at A6.
58 CRossn-w, supra note 41.
59 Id. The Center for Disease Control and Prevention recorded 105 violent school-re-
lated deaths in 1997-98. Id.
EFFECTS OF GUNS
several dozens more.60 In some areas across the country, gun violence
has become so severe6' that schools have installed metal detectors, hired
extra security, and added "drive-by shooting drills" and "intruder
drills" 62 to traditional fire drill schedules.63
B. THE CONSEQUENCES: EFFECTS OF GUN POSSESSION AND GUN-
RELATED VIOLENCE ON EDUCATION AND THE ECONOMY
1. Effect of School Violence on Education
Not surprisingly, "violent school crimes arouse destructive fears
among students, parents, and teachers" 64 long after the gunshots have
stopped echoing in the halls. After two students were murdered at a
Connecticut elementary school, "[k]ids didn't want to go to class, they
couldn't eat or sleep, they [would] burst out crying. ' 65 After a double-
murder and hostage situation in a rural Kentucky high school, it was
reported that:
There was little pattern to the post-trauma reactions.
One girl slept on the couch in her living room with a
parent on the floor beside her. Another studied at home
because she couldn't go back into the building. One boy
had to sit next to the door in all his classes because he
felt trapped anywhere else in the room. One day last
spring, a student [had] a terrifying flashback when a
prop for the senior prom crashed to the gymnasium
floor.
All of the students held hostage by the young killer
have now graduated. Still, for some the tears continue.66
The day after the murder of two teenagers in a New York high
school, the parents of several students asked for a transfer, attendance
60 See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text.
61 In New York City alone, six students were shot and killed and 13 were shot and
wounded in school buildings during the 1991-92 school year. See Anne Chase, School Vio-
lence: Two Ways to Fight Back, GOVERNING, Mar. 1993, at 20. About 45% of the 758 students
interviewed at 10 inner-city public high schools in California, New Jersey, Louisiana and Illi-
nois said they had been threatened with a gun or had been shot at on the way to or from school
within the previous few years. See Thomas, supra note 39; Pierre Thomas, Guns Seen as Part
of Life Among Inner-City Youths, WASH. PosT, Dec. 13, 1993, at A4.
62 Nanette Asimov et al., Bay Area Schools Reassessing Programs, S.F. CHRON., April
22, 1999, at AS.
63 See Toch et al., supra, note 17, at 32; Prevention and Punishment, supra note 16, at
654 (statement of Ronald D. Stephens, Exec. Dir., NSSC); supra notes 16-18 and accompany-
ing text.
64 Jackson Toby, Violence in Schools, Nat'l Inst. Just Research in Brief 3 (1983).
65 See Toech et al., supra note 17, at 34 (quoting Jettie Tisdale, principal of Longfellow
Elementary School, Bridgeport, Connecticut).
66 Buckley, supra note 54, at 46.
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was down fifty percent, classes were replaced with counseling sessions,
and classrooms became grieving rooms. 67
But it does not require a tragedy the magnitude of a double homi-
cide to disrupt America's education system. Chronic violent crime and
the prevalence of guns are disruptive as well. Studies conducted in the
1970s showed that students were fearful of certain school-related loca-
tions.68 As the number of guns and the frequency of gun-related vio-
lence have proliferated, these fears have increased. In a 1992 survey,
fifteen percent of inner-city high school students said they were afraid at
school almost all of the time.69 Sixteen percent of eighth graders, four-
teen percent of tenth graders and twelve percent of twelfth graders told
University of Michigan researchers that they fear for their safety.70 A
full thirty-seven percent of tenth and twelfth graders had reported that
they did not feel safe at school, and forty-three percent avoided school
restrooms.7
1
67 See Edna Negron, 400 Students Want Out of Jefferson HS, NEWSDAY, Feb. 28, 1992,
at 2. (Despite the Newsday article's title, "four or five"--not 400-parents had requested
transfers for their children. By the following day that number had risen to ten. The article was
corrected in a later edition of Newsday.).
68 One-third of junior high school pupils in large cities and nearly one-fifth of their coun-
terparts in rural areas reported being afraid of three or more places on school grounds, i.e.
bathrooms. See SAFE SCHooL REPORT, supra note 12 at 62 fig.l-6 & 64. As researchers have
concluded, "about 1.7 million junior and 2.0 million senior high youth [are] afflicted by mod-
erate or high levels of fear." Ivor Wayne & Robert J. Rubel, Student Fear in Secondary
Schools, 14 URn. REv. 197, 203 (1982). About 11% of them are afraid on the way to school at
least once a week. Id. at 219. In a study of 1,250 Philadelphia families having 12-year old
boys, two researchers determined that "about one-quarter found the school building itself dan-
gerous (halls and rooms), and about half were fearful of streets leading to and from school, and
the school yard." Id. at 198-99.
69 See J.F. Sheley et al., Gun Related Violence In and Around Inner-City Schools, 146
AM. J. DisAsss C1nNDR 677, 678-79 (1992).
70 Toch et al., supra note 17, at 32.
71 See Recess from Violence, supra note 41, at 39 (statement of Ronald D. Stephens,
Exec. Dir., NSSC).
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Fearing the violence, many students avoid school altogether. 72 This
same fear inhibits the learning of those who manage to stay in school.73
A 1972 study reported that:
The perception of the school environment as being dan-
gerous could very well influence the students' ability to
do well in school. A student who feels that he is in dan-
ger of being beaten up or robbed in the schoolroom is
not likely to devote full attention to his or her teacher.
Also, the perception of the schoolyard and halls as dan-
gerous may account somewhat for the high truancy rates
that are recorded by the inner-city schools.74
Indeed, a 1976 study of the criminal victimization of public school
students in Dade County, Florida, revealed that "about one-fifth of the
responding secondary school students [felt] that their ability to learn in
class was affected by their fear of other students."75 Students who were
highly apprehensive of their school for safety reasons were considerably
more likely to have below-average grades (D's and F'S).7 6 Very appre-
hensive students rated themselves much lower than their classmates in
72 "[S]tudents are frequently led by apprehensiveness to avoid some school locations and
that, in extreme cases, fear of the school setting makes students avoid school altogether."
Wayne & Rubel, supra note 68, at 230. According to the Justice Dep't, each day in the 1970's
160,000 kids failed to attend school because they were afraid to go. Id. (citing M. LAL AND
L. SAvrrz, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, DELINQUENCY AND CrrY LIFE (1972)). More recently,
nearly eight percent of urban junior and senior high school students missed at least one day of
school a month because they were afraid to go. NSSC, SAFE SCHOOLS Ov.RviEw, NSSC
RESOURCE PAPER, 3 (Feb. 1986). See SAFE SCHOOL REPORT, supra note 12, at 63 fig.1-17, 64.
See also Witkin, supra note 2, at 32 (citing study of Illinois high school students which found
that one in 12 students confessed to staying away from school out of fear). In 1996, five
percent of high school students nationwide, and as many as 17 percent in Chicago schools,
stayed home due to fear. Melissa Sickmund, Howard N. Snyder, and Eileen Poe-Yamagata,
Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, Juvenile Offenders and Victims: 1997
Update on Violence 14-15 (1997). See Hearings on H.R. 3757, supra note 18, at 44 (statement
of Joel Packer, Legislative Specialist, National Education Ass'n and National PTA) ("The
threat of violence is a significant factor in the dropout rate, the stress related to fear of violence
threatens the educational goals related to student achievement, and fear of violence impedes
the ability of schools to attract and retain qualified school personnel.").
73 See Betsy McAlister Groves et al., Silent Victims, Children Who Witness Violence,
269 JAMA 262, 262 (1993) (declaring that an "[e]xposure to violence adversely affects chil-
dren's development in many areas, including their ability to function in school, emotional
stability, and orientation toward the future").
74 Wayne & Rubel, supra note 68, at 199 (quoting M. LALLI & L. SAvrrz, U.S. DEP'T OF
JusTIcE, DELINQUENCY AN Crr Lim (1972)).
75 Id. The Safe School Study Report confirmed these results as a national phenomenon.
See SAFE SCHOOL REPORT, supra note 12, at 116 (reporting that 18% of attack victims were
afraid at school most of the time).
76 See Wayne & Rubel, supra note 68, at 204-05 & tbl.3, fig.I. See also NAT'L EDUC.
GOALS PANEL, THE NAT'L EDUC. GOALS REPORT: BUILDING A NATION OF LEARNERS 44
(1992) (determining that students in violent or drug-ridden schools were much less likely to
"stay in school, perform at higher academic levels, and excel in mathematics and science").
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reading ability.77 By 1993, sixty-three percent of tenth, eleventh and
twelfth graders reportedly believed that they would learn more if they
felt safer.78
Gun violence also affects parents and teachers. 79 Many parents do
not believe that the schools their children attend are safe,80 and many
teachers are unable to maintain environments conducive to learning. In
fact, twelve percent of secondary school teachers across the country-
and twenty-eight percent of secondary school teachers in the largest cit-
ies-admitted that they had hesitated to confront misbehaving students in
the preceding month, out of fear of retaliation. 8' This response affects
how students view the school system, creates an atmosphere of mistrust,
undermines school morale, and demonstrates that "student disorder is
more powerful than the adult call for order."82
2. The Long-Term Effects of Gun Violence in School
Gun violence in schools affects more than a child's feeling of safety
or ability to learn: it also creates a number of serious long-term
problems. In particular, gun violence in schools gives rise to millions of
dollars in medical costs, which are often paid out of public funds. Such
violence may also limit the child's future employment opportunities and
have long-term psychological consequences.
a. Medical Costs
Gun violence is expensive, and becoming more so as health costs
rise. In 1986, hospitalization costs (not including ambulance services,
77 See Wayne & Rubel, supra note 68, at 204-05 & fig.l.
78 See Recess from Violence, supra note 42, at 39 (1993) (statement of Ronald D. Ste-
phens, Exec. Dir., NSSC).
79 The mother of a 15-year-old boy who killed two teenagers at a New York high school
was afraid to walk outside her home alone for fear the victims' avengers would kill her. See
Mary B.W. Tabor, A Year Later, Death's Echoes, N.Y. TIMEs, June 24, 1993, at B3. The
mother of one of the victims moved out of her housing project. ld. The mother of another
student lamented, "You sit at home and you wonder if your kid will come home alive or not."
Negron, supra note 67, at 2. Shortly after a student was gunned down in a Los Angeles high
school, a teacher penned this rap lyric: "School's a place for learnin' / School's a place for fun
/ And that sure ain't gonna happen I If someone brings a gun." Tracey Kaplan, Fatal Shooting
at School Prompts Project to Spread Anti-Weapons Message, L.A. Tnmms, June 5, 1993, at B4.
80 Less than a third of parents believe that most children are safe at school. Ruttenberg,
supra note 48, at 1886 n.3 (citing Louis HARRis, LH RESEARCH, IssuE, SURvEY OF THE
AMERICAN PEOPLE ON GUNS As A CHmDREN's HEALTm ISSUE at iv, v (June 1993)); Cf. Mi-
chele Ingrassia, Growing Up Fast and Frightened, NvwswEnE, Nov. 22, 1993, at 52 (reporting
that 73% of parents and 56% of children fear that they or a family member would be victim-
ized by violent crime).
81 Jackson Toby, supra note 64, at 3. See also Maria Koklanaris, Change in Pupils Has
Teachers Scared, WASH. TmEs, Aug. 16, 1994, at Al (explaining that teachers may now be
more reluctant to interfere in altercations).
82 Wayne & Rubel, supra note 68, at 230-31.
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physicians fees, readmissions, ambulatory care, follow-up visits, physical
therapy, rehabilitation services, and long-term care) were estimated at
about $7,000 per gunshot patient.8 3 In 1990, hospitalization costs rose to
nearly $15,000 per gunshot patient,84 and more recently it was estimated
that "every gun injury amounts to more than $33,000 in medical costs-
exclusive of doctor's fees."8 5
These costs are largely the burden of taxpayers.86 Approximately
eighty-six percent of hospitalization costs are borne by public funds, in-
cluding Medi-Cal (Medicaid), Medicare, the Medically Indigent Adult
Program, the jail system, the Victims & Witnesses Assistance Program,
and bad debts written off by hospitals.8 7 In addition, recent escalation of
violence has placed substantial financial strain on urban trauma centers,
forcing some of them to close.88
The gun violence occurring in schools contributes significantly to
the total economic cost of gun violence overall. Assuming the 1986 cost
of $7,000 per gunshot patient, the seventy-one firearm deaths and 201
firearm injuries at schools in 1986-90 amounted to nearly $2 million in
hospitalization costs, over $1.6 million of which were borne by taxpay-
ers. Furthermore, the total economic costs of gun violence far exceed the
costs of medical treatment alone. It has been estimated that the total
costs to society of firearm injuries in 1985 amounted to approximately
$387,235 per fatality and $29,870 per non-fatal injury.8 9 At this rate, the
seventy-one firearm deaths and 201 firearm injuries occurring at schools
in 1986-90 cost society a total of-almost $33.5 million.
b. Employment Prospects
The quality of a student's education directly affects that student's
ultimate ability to compete economically in our society. Simply put, the
more education a student achieves, the less likely it is that the student
83 Michael J. Martin et al., The Cost of Hospitalization for Firearm Injuries, 260 JAMA
3048, 3050 (1988).
84 See Daniel W. Webster et al., Epidemiologic Changes in Gunshot Wounds in Wash-
ington DC, 1983-1990, 127 ARcHrvES OF SURGERY 694, 697 (1992) (basing figure on the
mean cost for hospital care, excluding physician fees, for a patient with a gunshot wound in
Washington, D.C., including both adults and children, between July 1, 1989, and June 30,
1990).
85 Donna Harrington-Lueker, Metal Detectors: Schools Turn To Devices Once Aimed
Only At Airport Terrorists, Ami. SCH. BD. J., May 1992, at 21, 22 24 (quoting Deane Calhoun
of Teens on Target in Oakland, California).
86 For a thorough updated discussion on the costs of gunshot wounds and the shifting of
those costs to others, see Erik Freeland, Guns, Money & Medicine, U.S. NEws & WoRLD REP.,
July 1, 1996, at 31.
87 See Martin et al., supra note 83, at 3049, tbl.3.
88 See Webster et al., supra note 84, at 694 (citing U.S. GENi. Accr. OFF., TRAUMA CARE:
LIFESAVING SYSTEM THREATENED BY UuNMURSED CosTs AND OTHER FACrORS (1991)).
89 Martin et al., supra note 83 at 3049-50.
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will be unemployed.90 In addition, higher levels of education directly
result in higher income. During the 1980s, for example, college gradu-
ates saw their real incomes rise by ten percent, whereas high school grad-
uates and high school dropouts saw their real incomes fall by ten
percent.91
c. Psychological Effects
Children today are exposed to significant amounts of violence and
school violence contributes to a student's overall level of exposure.
When schools, as well as the streets, are filled with violence, the child's
exposure to violence becomes chronic. This can cause the child to de-
velop symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder, which can impair so-
cial and academic behavior.92 One expert has noted that:
Children who live with danger develop defenses against
their fears, and these defenses can interfere with their
development. When children have to defend themselves
constantly from outside or inside dangers, their energies
are not available for other, less immediately urgent tasks,
such as learning to read and write and do arithmetic and
learning about geography and history and science. In
addition to not having enough energy to devote to
schoolwork, there is evidence that specific cognitive
functions such as memory and a sense of time can be
affected by experiencing trauma.93
90 See Human Capital, THE ECONOMIsr, Nov. 21, 1992, at 4. In 1989, people who did
not finish high school were over four times more likely than college graduates to be
unemployed.
91 See id. These statistics are not surprising. Better quality education develops personal
attributes that are useful in the job market or conducive to greater interest in continuing
schooling. See id. The benefits of education-and the necessity of education-become even
more important as we increase our reliance on automation and information technology, rather
than manual labor or low-skilled jobs. Id.
92 See JAMES GARBARiNO Er AL., CHILDREN IN DANGER: COPING Wrr THE CONSE-
QIJNCES OF COMMUNrry VIOLENCE 13, 25-26, 56-57, 67-99 (1992); Amicus Curiae Brief for
Children Now, Project on Children and Violence, Youth Alive, Children's Law Offices, Inc.
on Behalf of Petitioner, United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, app. at 10 (1995) (No. 93-1260)
(declaration of James Garbarino) [hereinafter Garbarino Deel.]. Symptoms of post-traumatic
stress disorder include sleep disturbances, day dreaming, recreating trauma in play, emotional
numbing, diminished expectations for the future, and even biochemical changes in the child's
brain that impair social and academic behavior. Children suffering from post-traumatic stress
disorder experience problems with their schoolwork more often than their classmates do. See
GARBmUNo Er AL., at 59 (finding that "[c]hildren exposed to chronic community violence
often develop problems related to school performance and intellectual development' such that,
children under seven exposed to such violence "could not learn in a normal classroom
situation").
93 Lorraine B. Wallach, Helping Children Cope with Violence, YOUNG CmLDREM, May
1993, at 4, 5-6 (citation omitted). See GARBun'No ET AL., supra note 92, at 55 (citation omit-
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In sum, the presence of guns in schools is a national concern. It
escalates school violence, takes lives, frightens students, intimidates
teachers, and impedes education. Guns in schools affect the national
economy directly in medical costs, and indirectly in the declining educa-
tion of our children.
II. APPROACHES TO CURBING GUN VIOLENCE IN SCHOOLS
State and federal governments have generally approached the prob-
lem of guns and gun violence in schools in three ways: (1) removing
guns from schools, primarily by criminalizing the possession of guns on
and around campus; (2) removing gun-carrying students from school by
suspending or expelling them; and (3) penalizing parents for their chil-
dren's gun possession. Each of these approaches gives rise to issues of
their legality94 and effectiveness. 95 This section examines deterrence
theory and the factors that make deterrence more likely. It applies deter-
rence theory to the efforts used to curb gun possession and gun violence
in schools. Finally, it suggests that local government-most sensitive to
the characteristics of its schools, communities, resources, culture and vi-
olence-would be more effective than the federal government at maxi-
mizing the possibility of deterrence.
A. DETERRENCE THEORY
According to deterrence theory, an actor will refrain from taking a
particular action if the losses resulting from that action outweigh the
gains.96 Conversely, if an actor expects to profit from his wrongful con-
duct, he will commit the wrong, despite potential liability. Thus, on one
ted) ("Children experiencing acute traumatic events lose interest in the world and try to avoid
anything that reminds them of the event; they also manifest feelings of estrangement, constric-
tion in affect and cognition, memory impairment, phobias, and impairment in performing daily
activities."). Violence also affects a child's representations of the world, warping the ability to
deal productively with the challenges of adulthood. A child exposed to chronic violence may
develop pathogenic conclusions such as, "the world is a hostile and dangerous place," "[it is
necessary to] kill or be killed," and "my enemies are less than human." Garbarino Deel., supra
note 92 at 10. In fact, recent research finds an association between a child's witnessing vio-
lence and subsequent development of emotional disturbances. Linda N. Freeman et al., Vio-
lent Events Reported by Normal Urban School-Aged Children: Characteristics and
Depression Correlates, 32 J. AM. ACAD. CHiLD ADOrascEiT PsYcHiATRY 419, 423 (1993).
94 See infra part IT, notes 151-162 and accompanying text.
95 See infra notes 105-124 and accompanying text.
96 This may be conceptualized by analogy to the formula of B = P x L, introduced by
Judge Learned Hand in United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947).
Here, B represents the benefit the actor derives from the act, P is the probability of ensuing
liability, and L is the severity of the liability. When the benefit of the act is less than the
liability the actor will suffer multiplied by the perceived probability of liability, the actor will
not engage in the act. For example, if the benefit, B, of an act has a value of $10, the fine for
committing that act is $30, and there is a .5 (50%) probability that liability will be imposed, the
actor will refrain from acting because $10 < .5 x $30, or $15.
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side of the equation, the severity of the sanction and the perceived cer-
tainty of its imposition determine the disincentives to commit the
wrong.97 These disincentives are weighed against the potential benefits
derived from committing the act, which may be skewed by the individual
characteristics of the actors we seek to deter.98 For example, a person
highly motivated to engage in a particular prohibited behavior is harder
to deter than one only marginally motivated.99 A person whose wrong-
doing is rewarded by his peers may be difficult to deter. 1°0 And an irra-
tional person, or one without adequate capacity or opportunity to
consider the risk of punishment before acting, may be nearly impervious
to the threat of prosecution.' 0 ' Therefore, if the actors customarily en-
gaged in the act are not susceptible to the threat of liability, neither in-
creased severity, nor perceived certainty, of the punishment will deter.102
The potential deterrent effect of laws intended to curb gun posses-
sion in schools will therefore depend upon how students perceive the
severity of the sanction, the likelihood that the sanction will be imposed,
and the perceived benefit of taking a gun to school. 0 3 It is important to
note, however, that even if a sanction is likely to deter, it may not be an
appropriate sanction for a state to adopt if the costs of imposing it would
outweigh the benefit society would derive from ridding itself of the
wrong.104
97 See Ruttenberg, supra note 48, at 1906-07; Roger C. Cramton, Driver Behavior and
Legal Sanctions: A Study of Deterrence, 67 MICH. L. REv. 421,427 (1989). Another factor in
the likelihood of deterrence is the timing of the penalty: the shorter the time between the act
and the punishment, the greater the deterrent effect. See Johannes Andenaes, The General
Preventive Effects of Punishment, 114 U. PA. L. Rv. 949, 961 n.21 (1966).
98 Cramton, supra note 97, at 427. These characteristics include the actor's motivation,
personality, and the "conflicting norms of groups to which the individual owes loyalty and
affection." Id. (citation omitted). These factors affect the benefit, B, perceived by the actor.
Theoretically, an increase in B may be offset, preserving the deterrent influence, by an
equivalent increase in P x L.
99 Id. at 425.
100 Id.
1O1 Ik at 426.
102 In our model, B, the actor's perceived benefit, increases as his motivation (or influ-
ences) to engage in the conduct increases. At some point, the actor becomes undeterrable
because the probability of apprehension and liability cannot exceed 100%. Any time the ac-
tor's benefit exceeds the potential liability, the actor will not be deterred.
103 It is admittedly difficult to predict the deterrent effect of a sanction directed at a child
or adolescent. Deterrence theory presupposes a rational actor who will weigh the potential
punishment and the likelihood of receiving it (i.e., the likelihood of apprehension, prosecution,
conviction, and incarceration) against the expected value of the act. Elementary and secondary
school students may not weigh these factors before acting, or they may give greater weight to
certain factors than a "rational" actor would. However, evaluating their behavior in these
terms provides valuable insight into potential remedies. Furthermore, the possibility that youth
will handle guns less rationally than adults confirms the need to keep them from taking a gun
to school.
104 See Dorsey D. Ellis, Jr., Fairness and Efficiency in the Law of Punitive Damages, 56
S. CAL. L. REv. 1, 8-9 (1982).
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B. THE DETERRENT EFFECT OF EFFORTS TO CuRB GUN POSSESSION
IN SCHOOLS
1. Banning Guns from Schools
The primary response to guns and gun violence in schools has been
to criminalize the possession of guns on campus. At least forty states
have criminal statutes outlawing the possession of firearms in school and
on school property.' 05 Some states-and the federal government under
the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990106- have gone further, seeking
to create a "gun-free zone" around schools. 10 7
However, the threat posed by a criminal sanction for taling a gun to
school may not outweigh the perceived benefit of doing so. In the first
place, those in difficult socio-economic conditions may not view the se-
verity of a potential criminal sentence for gun possession as particularly
grave. Such conditions, particularly poverty, 08 can cause some children
105 ALASKA STAT. § 11.61.195 (Michie Supp. 1997); Anxz. REv. STAT. § 13-3102(A)(12)
(1998); Aixn CODE ANN. § 5-73-119(a)(2) (Michie 1997); CAL. PENAL CODE § 626.9 (West
Supp. 1999); COLO. REv. STAT. § 18-12-105.5 (1997); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-217b
(West 1994); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-127.1 (1996 & Supp. 1998); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 790.115 (West Supp. 1998); FLA. STAT. AmN. § 810.095 (West 1994); IDAHO CODE § 18-
3302D (1997); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-47-9-2 (Lexis 1998); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4204(a)(5)
(Supp. 1997); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 527.070 (Banks-Baldwin Supp. 1997); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 20-A § 6552 (West 1993); MD. CODE ANN. art. 27, § 36A (Supp. 1997); MASS. ANN.
LAWS ch. 269, § 10(j) (Law. Co-op. 1992); MIcH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 750.237a (West Supp.
1998); MN. CODE ANN. § 609.66 Subd. 1 (West Supp. 1998); Miss. CODE ANN. § 97-37-17
(1994); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 571.030.1(8) (West Supp. 1999); NEB. REv. STAT. § 28-1204.4
(1995); NEV. REv. STAT. ANN. § 202.265 (Michie 1997); NJ. STAT. ANN. 2C:39-5(e) (West
Supp. 1998); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-7-2.1 (Michie Supp. 1998); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 265.01
(McKinney 1994 & Supp. 1997); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-269.2 (Supp. 1997); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 62.1-02-05 (1995); Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 2923.122 (Anderson Supp. 1996); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1280.1 (West Supp. 1999); OR. REv. STAT. § 166.370 (1990); 18 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 912 (West 1998); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-47-60 (1994); S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 16-23-430 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1997); S.D. CODmED LAWS 13-32-7 (Michie Supp. 1998);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-1309 (1997); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 46.03(a)(1) (West Supp.
1993); UTAH CODE ANN. § 54A-3-502 (1997); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 4004 (1998); VA.
CODE ANN. § 18.2-308.1 (1996); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 9.41.280 (West 199); W.VA.
CODE § 61-7-11a (1997).
106 18 U.S.C. § 922(q) (Supp. II 1996). The Act was held unconstitutional in United
States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). See infra notes 261-273 and accompanying text. The
Act was amended in 1996 as part of the Omnibus Appropriations Bill for 1997, 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(q) (amending 18 U.S.C. § 922 (1994)).
107 CAL. PnnAL CODE § 626.9 (West Supp. 1999); 720 ILL. CoMP. STAT. ANN. 5 24-1
(West Supp. 1998); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14:95.2 (West Supp. 1999); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 948.605 (West 1996).
108 Researchers have correlated youth violence with the presence of various "risk factors,"
including poverty, repeated exposure to violence, drugs, easy access to firearms, unstable fam-
ily life and family violence, delinquent peer groups, and media violence. See Ruttenberg,
supra note 48, at 1894, 1902-03; Barbara Kantrowitz, Wild in the Streets, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 2,
1993, at 40, 46.
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to develop a fatalism about their lives,1°9 rendering the threat of criminal
punishment virtually meaningless. 110
Secondly, even if the criminal sanction is actually perceived to be
serious, the likelihood of its enforcement may be low. Not all school
districts have metal detectors or the additional personnel necessary to
detect weapons and apprehend students carrying the weapons. And the
criminal justice system, especially for juveniles, is neither swift nor
certain.
At the same time, the perceived benefits of taking a gun to school
may be significant. The immediate threat of armed gang members or
other dangers at school may greatly exceed the threat of arrest and con-
viction. In fact, most students who carry guns to school say that they do
so for self-protection."' Students who genuinely believe they are in
danger, and who have access to guns will, therefore, have great incentive
to take a gun to school.
Another incentive to carrying a gun is status. Owning and carrying
guns may be alluring, particularly to younger students. 112 Some teenag-
ers, in their search for acceptance and identity, turn to peer groups that
are armed or enamored with guns." 3 And students themselves report
that gangs and peer groups are a major factor contributing to school vio-
109 Their conditions are so severe, and so filled with death and despair, that some children
have begun planning their own funerals. See Mary A. French, In Black Despair, June 20,
1993, at Cl.
110 See Vernon Houk & Rueben C. Warren, The Necessity of Social Change in Preventing
Violence, 106 PuB. HEALTH REP. 228 (1991) ("Faced with such bleak prospects, some minor-
ity youth have feelings of anger and hopelessness about the future. Many sense that what they
do does not matter because they do not believe they will live to see middle age."); Ruttenberg,
supra note, 48 at 1908 ("Sadly, many American children and youths today see their future
prospects as so bleak that potential criminal sanctions seem meaningless. Some take it for
granted that they will not live past their twentieth birthdays.").
111 Deane Calhoun & Nancy Gannon, Students and Guns (unpublished survey of 261
Oakland, California junior and senior high school students, on file with the Oakland Gun and
Safety Task Force) (1988). In suburban Jefferson Parish, Louisiana, where 21% of high
schoolers admitted they had carried a gun within in the past year, 73% said they did so for
protection. Toch et al., supra note 17, at 34. In surveys of 835 youth in prison and 1,653
students from inner-city schools, self-protection was the primary reason for carrying a gun, as
"the odds of surviving are seen to be better if one is armed than if not." James D. Wright et
al., Kids, Guns, and Killing Fields, Socr=rY, Nov.-Dec. 1992, at 84, 88. See also Sarah
Glazer, Violence in Schools, 2 CQ REsEARcHER 787 (1992) (citing a 1990 survey by the
Center for Disease Control that found that one in five high school students carries a weapon at
least once a month for self-protection or in a fight); Sickmund, et al., supra note 73, at 27
(two-thirds of juvenile arrestees said they carried a gun for protection or self-defense.
112 Calhoun & Gannon, supra note 111.
113 DEBORAH PRoTHRow-SMrH & MCHAELE WEIssmAN, DEADLY CoNsEQUENCES 97
(1991) (noting that gangs "provide young people with goals and objectives, a world, and a
place where they are valued" and a manufactured identity, dramatically symbolized in the
wearing of gang "colors").
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lence.114 Meanwhile, movies and television bombard children and ado-
lescents with the glorification of guns and gun violence, 115 consequently
desensitizing children to the dangers that guns create." 6 Video games
and song lyrics also glorify violence and guns, teaching our children that
it is appropriate to handle anger, rejection and frustration with vengeance
and violence. 117 In addition, gun manufacturers, searching for a new
market for their products, target children by selling weapons resembling
those featured in movies, and for less than the cost of popular shoes."18
Because carrying a gun has thus become a status symbol in many dis-
tricts, the risk of being caught with a gun provides little deterrent.
2. Removing Students from Schools
A number of states have enacted laws providing for the suspension
or expulsion of students who possess guns at school. 119 Some of these
114 Id. For other factors contributing to school violence, see Factors, infra note 143 and
accompanying text.
115 See W. James Potter & William Television, An Analysis of the Contexts of Antisocial
Acts on Prime-Time Television, 14 COMM. RES. 664, 664-86 (1987). Television portrays
approximately 90% of aggressive actions as justified, and 88% of those actions are ultimately
rewarded. See id. at 683. The fourteen-year old who shot eight classmates during a school
prayer meeting reportedly stated that he was inspired by the 1995 movie, The Basketball Dia-
ries. This film includes a dream sequence in which the protagonist (played by Leonardo Di-
Caprio) kills several students and a teacher while his classmates cheer. See Blank & Cohen,
supra note 1.
116 A child who is surrounded by guns and violence in the home, in the community, and
in the media becomes desensitized to the dangers of guns and the adverse effects of violence.
See CHmDREN's DmFEsE FuND, THE STAin OF A EmmucA's CmuDRm, 1992 xii, (reporting TV
Guide's estimate that a violent incident is shown on television every six minutes on average).
A typical child has witnessed 8,000 murders and more than 100,000 other acts of violence by
the time he or she reaches seventh grade. l
117 Some believe that video games, as well as television, lead to violence. See Carl T.
Hall, Experts Cite Media, Absent Parents, as Possible Explanations, S.F. CHRON., April 22,
1999, at A5. Some opine that music with violent messages also breeds violence, as in the case
of the 1999 shootings committed by teenagers at Colorado's Columbine High School. See
Michael Fleeman, Root of Youth Violence Scrutinized, S.F. CHRON., April 24, 1999, at A3.
While violent songs and entertainment might not directly cause gun violence, they seem to be
a contributing factor or "trigger." See id. at A3. The family of one of the students killed in the
1997 Kentucky high school shooting filed a $130 million lawsuit against entertainment compa-
nies that produce violent movies and computer games. Cox News Service, Victimized Towns
Relive Horror of Shootings, S.F. CHRON., April 21, 1999, at A6.
118 See Price, supra note 4, at IA; see also VioLENcE PoLicY CmerrR, CEASE Fm.E: A
CompREHENsrvE SPA-EGoY TO REDuCE FnAivs VIoLENCE (1994) (visited Nov. 17, 1998)
<http:llwvw.vpc.org/studies/cfcont.htm> (The executive summary appeared as an article in
the March 20, 1994 edition of ROLLING STONE magazine) Gunmakers have tapped into the
hype and popularity that has surrounded high-level sneakers and logo-jackets. Id. See Price,
supra note 37 and accompanying text.
119 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 16-1-24.1 (1995); INr. CODE ANN. § 20-8.1-5-9 (Michie
1997); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 158.150(1)(a) (Banks-Baldwin 1995); WASH. REv. CODE ANN.
§ 9.41.280 (West 1998). Most of the States enacted such a measure after the federal govern-
ment conditioned federal education funds on such a law. In October 1994, Congress passed
the Gun-Free Schools Act of 1994, 20 U.S.C. § 8921 (1994). The Act requires, as a condition
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expulsion programs include assignment to special educational facilities,
while others do not.120 To the student who takes a gun to school, the
gravity of a suspension or expulsion is likely no more significant than
that of a fine or criminal sentence. In addition, the likelihood of enforce-
ment may be perceived as quite low because expelling or suspending a
student, like criminal prosecution, requires catching the student with a
firearm.
Furthermore, and perhaps most importantly, a deterrent is not ap-
propriate if its social costs exceed its social benefits. Consider that ex-
pulsion does not only take the gun out of school; it takes the student out
of school. If the state does not then provide an expelled student with an
alternative school, the student's educational opportunities will be re-
duced. In the alternative, if the state does provide an alternative school
to expelled students, it will incur additional expenses to provide that op-
portunity. 121 In addition, expelling or suspending a student may leave
the student on the streets, which may often be more dangerous than
school. Even if the student is suspended rather than expelled, he or she
will miss instruction and may distrust the authority that ordered the
suspension.122
3. Penalizing Parents
Some states have imposed penalties on parents or guardians if their
child takes a gun to school. 123 Presumably, the parent who is aware of
the statute has an increased incentive to ascertain whether his or her child
has a gun. That parent will then also have increased incentive to prevent
to receiving federal aid, all school districts expel, for at least one year, any student caught
taking a gun to school.
120 See Jonathan Martin, Legislators Poised to Take Harsher Stand on Guns in Schools,
SEirrm Trams, Feb. 1, 1995, at B1 (discussing a proposed automatic-year-long expulsion for
students with guns and an established intense semester-long reentry program for serious of-
fenders). See ALA. CODE § 16-1-24.1 (1995) (restrictions on readmission).
121 At least one court has held that the state must provide an alternative school for stu-
dents suspended or expelled. See Leon v. Greenbrier County Bd. of Educ., 484 S.E.2d 909
(W.Va. Dec. 13, 1996).
122 AMALuA CUERVO Er AL., NATIONAL SCHOOL BoARDs Ass'N, TowARD BE=rR AND
SAFER ScHoois: A SCHOOL LEaDER's GUrE TO DELINQUENCY PREVENTION 18 (1984). Fur-
thermore, it appears that many students who are suspended or expelled do not finish their
education. Id. at 18-19.
123 See, e.g., OxLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 858 (West 1993) (fining parents who allow their
children to possess firearms at school or certain other public places without notifying the
school or law enforcement); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-1312 (1997) (misdemeanor for parents
to allow children to possess firearm at school); Editorial, Straight Shooter: Gov. Casey's Rea-
sonable Plan to Control Assault Weapons, PrrSBURGH POST-GAZET, Mar. 14, 1994, at B2
(proposed bill); Gregg Krupa, New Gun-Control Plans Could Tighten Local Law, BOSTON
GLOBE, June 20, 1993, at 29 ("[lMen states do have laws that hold parents criminally responsi-
ble when they do not properly secure weapons, and their children pick them up and do harm to
themselves or others.").
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the child from taking the gun to school. These statutes, however, suffer
from the detection and enforcement problems that plague punishments
directed at the child. In fact, enforcement is even less likely because of
the difficulty in proving that the parent actually knew the child had taken
the gun to school. 124 In addition, parents who genuinely believe their
child needs to carry a gun for protection will not be deterred by the slight
possibility of a moderate fine.
B. INCREASING THE DETERRENT EFFECT OF EFFORTS TO CuiR GUN
VIOLENCE IN SCHOOLS
In theory, increasing the severity of a sanction increases the likeli-
hood of deterrence. 125 Here, however, increasing the punishment for gun
possession may be perceived as an empty threat (if not enforced) or, if
enforced, remove youth from school and place them into the criminal
system or onto more savage streets. More productive alternatives in-
clude (1) increasing the perceived likelihood of existing sanctions
through better detection of the violation; and (2) decreasing the perceived
benefit of gun possession by making students feel more secure, teaching
them about conflict resolution and the dangers of guns, and making it
more difficult for them to obtain a gun.126
1. Increasing the Likelihood of Enforcement
Increasing the likelihood that gun restrictions will be enforced may
be accomplished in a number of ways. First, schools may use metal de-
tectors to increase firearm detection. 127  The use of metal detectors,
124 It is reported that these laws are not prosecuted aggressively. See Katherine Seligman,
Law Winks at Parents of Kids Who Use Guns, S.F. EXAM'R, Mar. 29, 1998, at Al.
125 See supra notes 96-104 and accompanying text.
126 See PANEL ON THE UNDERSTANDING & CONTROL OF VIOLENT BEHAVIOR, NAT'L RES.
CoUNCIL, UNDESTANDiNa AND PREVENTING VioL.ENCE 6, 292-94 (Albert J. Reiss, Jr. & Jef-
frey A. Roth eds., 1993) ("50% increase in the probability of incarceration would prevent
twice as much crime as a 50% increase in the average term of incarceration"); Guns in
Schools-A Federal Role?: Hearings on S. 890 Before the Subcomm. on Youth Violence of the
Senate Judiciary Comm., 104th Cong. 89 (1995) [hereinafter Hearings on S. 890] (statement
of Larry Kramer, Professor of Law, New York University) ("The problem in [combating
school violence] is not a dearth of laws, but a problem of enforcement.").
127 The Supreme Court has not determined whether a suspicionless metal detector search
violates the Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable searches. Courts have usually
held that the "search" performed by a metal detector at an airport is reasonable. See United
States v. Albarado, 495 F.2d 799 (2d Cir. 1974); United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 908
(9th Cir. 1973); United States v. Slocum, 464 F.2d 1180 (3d Cir. 1972). Unlike an airline
traveler, however, a student is compelled by the state to attend school and thus be subjected to
a search. On the other hand, the student has advance notice that a metal detector is at the
school entrance. See Klarfeld v. United States, 944 F.2d 583, 586 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding
metal detectors permissible at courthouse entrances as a result of threats of violence which
require "urgent need" for protective measures) (citing McMorris v. Alioto, 567 F.2d 897 (9th
Cir. 1978)); People v. Dukes, 580 N.Y.S.2d 850 (Crim. Ct 1992) (holding hand-held detector
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however, has a number of potential drawbacks. Metal detectors can be
expensive, 28 and the expense is compounded by the fact that schools
typically have so many entrances and alternate means of access that a
large number of the devices would be necessary.' 29 In addition, install-
ing metal detectors only at doors to school buildings would not detect
guns on school grounds outside the buildings. For example, the two sus-
pected shooters in the Jonesboro, Arkansas shooting waited outside
among bushes for the victims to walk out of the school building before
firing upon them. 130 Thus, it may be necessary to enclose the campus by
a fence and position metal detectors at a limited number of gates. More-
over, some view metal detectors to be labor intensive, time consuming,
and not particularly effective in preventing violence.131
Second, a school may use an anonymous tip system to increase the
likelihood of discovering that a student is carrying a gun. 132 To en-
courage students to provide these tips, school districts could educate stu-
dents on the importance of disclosing guns on campus and even pay
students for information leading to the confiscation of guns or to ar-
rests. 133 One such program in Tennessee has reportedly met with some
success.134
to search students permissible because minimally intrusive); TENN. CODE ANN. 49-6-4207
(1994) (authorizing use of metal detectors).
128 Hand-held metal detectors, sometimes called "wands," cost approximately $115 each.
Walk-through devices cost on average approximately $2,500 each and are much more effective
in detecting metal. See Toch, supra note 17, at 35. However, walk-through devices can actu-
ally cost as much as $10,000 each and the x-ray devices used to search book bags cost even
more, around $17,000. See Glazer, supra note 111, at 790.
129 See Clifford Krauss, Teenager Shoots Fellow Student at Their High School in Brook-
lyn, N.Y. TMs, Sept. 15, 1994, at Al (reporting that student entered side door to evade metal
detector); See also Karel Holloway, High School's Metal Detector Fails to Find Weapons,
DALLAs MORNING Naws, June 7, 1994, at 18A (reporting that properly set up metal detectors
missed weapons altogether).
130 See Shaken Kids Hudle for Comfort, supra note 7.
131 Glazer, supra note 111, at 790.
132 "Warrantless" searches of students based on anonymous tips have been upheld. See
S.D. v. State, 650 So. 2d 198, 199 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995); State v. Joseph T., 336 S.E.2d
728, 737 (W.Va. 1985). See infra note 160 and accompanying text.
133 See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 582 (Kennedy, J., concurring); Christina
Lima, Schools May Launch Weapons Hot Line, L.A. TuMms, Jan. 13, 1995, at B1. In one
program, Students anonymously call Crime Stoppers, a nationwide non-profit organization that
residents can call to report crimes. Crime Stoppers notifies the police department, which noti-
fies the school, which searches the suspect. The student caller then receives a reward of $50.
See id. A similar program was begun in a school in Tucson, Arizona, after experiencing more
than one incident per day involving handguns. See Reward for Tips on Guns in Tucson
Schools, ARIz. Rm., Jan. 7, 1995, at B2. School districts in California have considered adopt-
ing such a program as well. See Lima, supra note 133.
134 In the first year of the Tennessee program, police confiscated over 300 weapons, in-
cluding 115 guns. Students appeared supportive, and Memphis schools reported a decrease in
the number of weapon-related crimes. See Lima, supra note 133.
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Third, when school districts have a reasonable suspicion that some-
thing unlawful is present, they may increase searches of students,
backpacks and lockers. 135 Fourth, school districts may increase the
awareness of parents and teachers of efforts to enforce existing laws and
regulations, thereby increasing the perception, if not the reality, of the
chances of detection and punishment. 136
It is important to note that all of these measures have potential ad-
verse effects on the school environment. Searches of students, as well as
the use of metal detectors and informant systems, diminish privacy and
may make students feel oppressed.137
Whether the economic cost and adverse effects of these tactics are
deemed worth a potential increase in school safety depends upon the cir-
cumstances of each school. For example, the degree to which these
measures intrude into the lives of students and teachers depends, in part,
on the school's architecture and the configuration of the school
grounds.' 38 The nature of the school environment-including the extent
of gun violence in the school and the perspectives of teachers, parents,
and students-will dictate the perceived need for intrusive measures.
Each of these factors will vary by school district, and a solution suitable
for one region of the country may be unsuitable for another. Ideally,
each school district should best understand its own needs and resources
and be able to predict its community's reaction. By comparison, federal
officials are less likely to be familiar with specific local circumstances.
The interjection of federal officials, therefore, could interrupt longstand-
ing and close working relationships between school administrators, po-
lice and prosecutors. It could also interfere with local development of
programs particularly suited to a specific school, community, or district.
Thus, local government would likely strike the most acceptable balance
135 See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985); Zamora v. Pomeroy, 639 F.2d 662,
670 (10th Cir. 1981); in re William G., 709 P.2d 1287, 1295 (1985); In re Joseph G., 38 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 902 (Ct. App. 1995); in re DuBois, 821 P.2d 1124 (Or. Ct. App. 1991); State v.
Slattery, 787 P.2d 932, 933 (Wash. CL App. 1990) (holding it permissible for school officials
to search student's car for drugs); Commonwealth v. Carey, 554 N.E.2d 1199 (Mass. 1990).
See infra note 160 and accompanying text.
136 See Cramton, supra note 97; Andenaes, supra note 97.
137 See Glazer, supra note 111, at 790 (noting the concern that metal detectors and
searches adversely impact the school environment, but also reporting that students actually
liked having the metal detectors). Cf. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S.
624, 637 (1943) ("That they are educating the young for citizenship is reason for scrupulous
protection of Constitutional freedoms of the individual, if we are not to strangle the free mind
at its source and teach youth to discount important principles of our government as mere
platitudes.").
138 See Donald L. Beci, School Violence: Protecting Our Children and the Fourth
Amendment, 41 CATH. U.L. Rav. 817, 839-43 (1992) (suggesting potential solutions for reduc-
ing school violence without disrespecting individual rights, including design and architecture
of school to minimize obtrusiveness of surveillance).
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between costly oppressive security measures and the risks of gun
violence.
2. Decreasing the Perceived Benefit of Possessing a Gun
As discussed above, the perceived benefit of bringing a gun to
school often stems from the students' belief that they need protection,
and from a desire to gain respect or status among their peers. 139 Stu-
dents' perceived need for self-protection may be abated in a number of
ways. Schools might increase security personnel and patrols, not only on
campus but also on buses and in the immediate vicinity of schools.
Metal detectors, surveillance cameras in hallways and parking lots, and
discreet security monitors in restrooms (where students are reportedly
most afraid) may increase student safety and decrease the existing need
for self-protection. 14
Impressing upon students that there are alternatives to violent re-
sponses, and actually teaching them methods of resolving conflict by
other means may also help create a safer environment, and reduce the
perceived need for guns.141 Educating children and their parents,
through informational programming or public service announcements, on
the dangers and drawbacks of possessing a firearm may likewise dispel
the perception that a gun serves as a status symbol. 142 Providing students
139 See supra notes 111-118 and accompanying text.
140 See Stem v. New Haven Community Sch., 529 F. Supp. 31 (E.D. Mich. 1982) (permit-
ting visual surveillance of students through two-way restroom mirrors on the ground that stu-
dents have reduced expectations of privacy at school). See also Glazer, supra note 110, at 790
(reporting that students appreciated the presence of metal detectors both for protection and for
the personal attention the students receive during the process).
141 An analysis of such programs predicted that they would not "produce long-term
changes in violent behavior or risk of victimization." Daniel W. Webster, The Unconvincing
Case for School-Based Conflict Resolution Programs for Adolescents, HAaTH AoIAms Win-
ter 1993, at 126, 127. Conflict resolution skills may not "counterbalance the real-life problems
of a child who, for example, is living in poverty, a dangerous neighborhood, and an unstable
family." Ruttenberg, supra note 48, at 1906. Programs directed more specifically to the dan-
gers of guns might be successful, however. For example, a 16-month evaluation of over 2,000
middle school students, sponsored by the National Institute of Justice, tested the effectiveness
of two New York City middle school violence prevention programs from February 1993 to
June 1994. See U.S. DaP'T OF JUST., NATIONAL INsTrrUTE OF JusncE UPDATE, EVALUATION
OF VIOLENCE PREVENTION PROGRAMS IN MIDDLE SCHOOLS (August 1995). Project S.T.O.P.
(Schools Teaching Options for Peace) was a conflict resolution program including a curricu-
lum and peer mediation. The Safe Harbor Program included a curriculum, counseling, and a
schoolwide anti-violence campaign. Id The study showed that students in the S.T.O.P. pro-
gram used reasoning to resolve conflicts more often than those who did not participate in the
program. Students who participated in the Safe Harbor Program were less likely to believe
that violent retaliation was necessary. Id. In addition, the Center to Prevent Handgun Vio-
lence has developed an educational program called "STAR" (Straight Talk About Risks), in-
volving role playing exercises designed to promote appropriate responses to dangerous
situations for pre-kindergarten to 12th graders.
142 See, e.g., Violence Having Traumatic Effect on Kids, Study Says, MESA TRW., Apr.
24, 1993, at A3 (early-childhood organization contends that "an anti-violence campaign simi-
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with alternate sources of self-esteem, by actively recognizing their tal-
ents, engendering a respect for life and others, and instilling hope for the
future, might also counteract the negative influences that make gun vio-
lence seem acceptable. 143
The perceived "benefit" of carrying a gun-whether for protection
or status-may also be reduced by making it more difficult to obtain one.
Federal laws have, for years, prohibited sales to minors by licensed fire-
arm dealers. 144 Fairly recent legislation outlaws most sales to minors
(and possession by minors) altogether' 45 and vigilant enforcement of
laws prohibiting juvenile gun possession has been shown to reduce juve-
nile violence.146 Additional laws make it more difficult for children and
young teens to gain access to guns stored in their homes. Because a
substantial number of loaded handguns are not stored properly, 147 some
states have passed laws that make parents liable for injuries caused by
lar to the anti-drunken driving movement could increase public awareness" and could "shap[e]
public opinion along the lines of the anti-drinking driving campaigns").
143 See supra notes 113-118 and accompanying text. Strong positive influences from
family, school, churches or other groups may establish a belief system that gives meaning,
acceptance, self-esteem and hope to youth, or at least buffer violent influences from the media
and some peers. To be sure, much of this must come from the home. Teachers believe that the
primary causes of school violence are lack of parental supervision at home, lack of family
involvement with the school, and exposure to violence in the media. See Factors Contributing
to School Violence, at <www.eric-web.tc.columbia.edu/monographs/udsl07/prevent-
ing-factors.html> (visited April 25, 1999) [hereinafter Factors] (citing Violence In America's
Public Schools THE AMERICAN TEACHER (1993)). Students agree that lack of parental supervi-
sion at home, as well as peer groups, are the major causes of school violence. Id. Sadly, the
15-year old shooter in the 1998 Oregon incident said he "had no other choice" but to shoot.
See Cox News Service, Victimized Towns Relive Horror of Shootings, S.F. CHRON., April 21,
1999, at A6.
144 18 U.S.C. § 922(b)(1) (1999). The problem, however, is that juveniles often get their
guns from friends, family or on the street, and these transactions may not be covered by laws
regulating licensed dealers. See supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text.
145 18 U.S.C. § 922(x) (1999). See infra notes 299-316 and accompanying text.
146 According to a May 1995 California report, "juvenile violence could be reduced by
limiting the number of firearms illegally possessed by juveniles.' CLIFrON CuRRY, LEGiSLA-
mra ANALYsTs OFmcn, Juvmm CIaE-OutLOOK FOR CALIFORNIA, MAY 1995 (visited
April 20, 1998) <www.lao.ca.gov kkpart6.html>. Research from experiments in Kansas City
recently showed that "the use of law enforcement personnel whose sole responsibility was to
seize illegal guns in gun 'hot spots' increased gun seizures by 65% and reduced the incidence
of violence in those areas by 49%." Il In other areas of the city, which did not employ
targeted patrols, gun-related crime slightly increased, perhaps because it was "displaced" from
the targeted areas. See id.
147 Seligman, supra note 124, at A14 (reporting a 1996 survey by the National Institute of
Justice that one in three handguns is stored unlocked and loaded).
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guns stored unsafely. 148 There is some evidence that these "safe storage"
laws are effective. 149
Increased security and educational programs, however, cost money,
as does the enforcement of laws prohibiting the sale of, or juvenile ac-
cess to, firearms. Furthermore, extensive security measures intrude on
student privacy and may thereby negatively affect the school environ-
ment. Here again, it is local government that is most familiar with the
extent of the violence-and possible reactions to the measures by teach-
ers, students and parents-in each area. State and local governments
should be best able to evaluate which of these methods, if any, would be
most effective in reducing the perceived need for and allure of guns.150
In sum, measures intended to curb gun violence will deter only if
the perceived costs of taking a gun to school outweigh the perceived
benefits. State and local governments are best able to maximize the ap-
parent risk of having a gun at school, by employing the particular meas-
ures that will increase perceptions that firearms will be detected and the
laws will be enforced. They are also best able to determine how to mini-
mize the students' perceived need for guns, by increasing security, pro-
viding examples of appropriate conflict resolution, and giving students
alternative sources of status or self-esteem.
III. THE TRADITIONAL PROVINCE AND POWERS OF THE
STATES TO REGULATE GUNS AND SCHOOLS, AND THE
NEED FOR FEDERAL SUPPORT
The states have traditional authority over education and local law
enforcement. Despite their best intentions, however, they may be unable
to devote sufficient resources to effectively combat the growing and
complex problem of gun violence in schools. Accordingly, there is sig-
nificant cause to supplement state efforts with federal resources, resolve,
and regulation. This is particularly urgent in light of the national ramifi-
cations of school violence.
148 In California, a parent who keeps a firearm at home, knowing that a child is likely to
gain access to it, may be charged with a felony if the child uses the gun to harm himself or
others. See id. at Al (reporting that Florida and Connecticut also have such laws, but that the
law is not stringently enforced).
149 See id. at A14 (reporting a study that found there was a 40% reduction in unintentional
shooting deaths after enactment of felony legislation). Enforcement of safe storage laws could
also reduce the number of stolen guns, which are typically used in crime or sold in secondary
markets (such as street sales and gun shows) that are difficult to regulate.
150 Other measures directly restricting children's access to guns would of course also
reduce gun possession and, presumably, gun violence. See Ruttenberg, supra note 48, at 1904-
05, 1910-11. See also Witkin et al., supra note 2, at 26 ("[Ihe biggest difference in today's
atmosphere is that the no-problem availability of guns in every nook of the nation has turned
record numbers of everyday encounters into deadly ones.").
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A. THE STATE'S INTERESTS IN EDUCATION AND THE POLICE POWER
In Brown v. Board of Education,'5' the United States Supreme
Court declared that "education is perhaps the most important function of
state and local governments.' 52 The Court further explained that:
Compulsory school attendance laws and the great ex-
penditures for education both demonstrate our recogni-
tion of the importance of education to our democratic
society. It is required in the performance of our most
basic public responsibilities, even service in the armed
forces. It is the very foundation of good citizenship. To-
day it is the principal instrument in awakening the child
to cultural values, in preparing him for later professional
training, and in helping him to adjust normally to his
environment. In these days, it is doubtful that any child
may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is
denied the opportunity of an education.' 53
The regulation of education has historically been the province of the
states.154 Through local control over education, school authorities work
with parents and local governments to fashion regulations best suited for
a particular school district or community. 155
Although the state's interest in education is not absolute, 156 the state
may regulate activities that detract from the quality of education pro-
vided at school. In addition, children are subject to more stringent regu-
151 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
152 Id. at 493.
153 Id. See also School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 230 (1963) (Brennan, J., concur-
ring) ("Americans regard the public schools as a most vital civic institution for the preserva-
tion of a democratic system of government."); Meyer v. State of Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400
(1923) ("American people have always regarded education and acquisition of knowledge as
matters of supreme importance.").
154 See, e.g., Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 741-42 (1974); San Antonio Sch. Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 50 (1973).
155 See, e.g., Milliken, 418 U.S. at 741 ("No single tradition in public education is more
deeply rooted than local control over the operation of schools; local autonomy has long been
thought essential both to the maintenance of community concern and support for public
schools and to quality of the educational process."); San Antonio Sch. Dist., 411 U.S. at 50
(1973) (noting local control over education process permits structuring of school programs to
fit local needs and encourages "experimentation, innovation, and a healthy competition for
educational excellence").
156 See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213 (1972) (holding that although providing
public school regulation "ranks at the very apex of the function of a State," compulsory attend-
ance law struck down under Free Exercise Clause); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510
(1925) (holding that state could not compel public school attendance, because state's interest
in education yields to right of parents to provide equivalent private education).
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lations than adults are, especially in a school environment. 157 Therefore,
restrictions necessary for the control of students are generally valid if
they address conduct that disturbs the peace and order of the class-
room.15 8 Thus, an ordinance prohibiting noise or diversions tending to
disturb classes is valid. 159 Searches of student lockers, backpacks and
persons without search warrants are similarly permissible provided there
is some reasonable suspicion that the student possesses something
unlawful. 160
Furthermore, the state has a general interest in protecting its citizens
from harm and in preserving "[p]ublic safety, public health, morality,
peace and quiet, law and order" and general welfare. 161 Pursuant to this
police power, the states have the authority to regulate the use and posses-
sion of guns. 162
Therefore, in light of both their interests in education and their po-
lice powers, states may unquestionably regulate the possession of guns
on school property. 163 In particular, states may enact statutes that
157 See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhimeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988) (holding that school
need not tolerate student speech in school newspaper that is inconsistent with its educational
mission, even if such speech would be protected outside school); Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v.
Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1968) (finding first amendment rights of students not coextensive with
rights of adults in other settings, and student could be disciplined for a speech that was sexu-
ally explicit); Montalvo v. Madera Unified Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 21 Cal. App. 3d 323, 330
(1971) ("[A] student may be subject to far more stringent regulations than an adult outside a
school environment due to his immaturity and status as a student in a school environment
where disciplinary and health problems and considerations relating to safety of minors take on
special significance.").
158 See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509 (1969) (holding that
students cannot be punished for expressing personal views on school premises unless school
authorities have reason to believe it will "substantially interfere with the work of the school or
'impinge upon the rights of other students").
159 See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 119 (1972) (upholding ordinance
against vagueness and overbreadth challenges, and declaring that "schools could hardly toler-
ate boisterous demonstrators who drown out classroom conversation, make studying impossi-
ble, block entrances, or incite children to leave the schoolhouse").
160 See, e.g., New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985) (holding that searches of students
are exempt from the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement and need only be reasonable
under the circumstances); Stem v. New Haven Community Sch., 529 F. Supp. 31 (E.D. Mich.
1982) (permitting visual surveillance of students through two-way restroom mirrors on the
ground that students have reduced expectations of privacy at school).
161 Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954).
162 See, e.g., Fresno Rifle and Pistol Club, Inc. v. Van de Kamp, 746 F. Supp. 1415, 1417-
19 (E.D. Cal. 1990), aff'd, 965 F.2d 723 (9th Cir. 1992); Burton v. Sills, 248 A.2d 521, 526,
531 (N.J. 1968), appeal dismissed, 394 U.S. 812 (1969).
163 See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549,581 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("If a State or
municipality determines that harsh criminal sanctions are necessary and wise to deter students
from carrying guns on school premises, the reserved powers of the States are sufficient to
enact those measures."); People v. Singer, 128 Cal. Rptr. 920 (1976) (upholding California
Penal Code § 629.9, prohibiting guns on campus, against due process and equal protection
challenges because there was a rational distinction between public schools and other public
places where unloaded firearms may be lawfully possessed).
EFFEcrs OF GuNs
criminalize the possession of guns in or around schools, require expul-
sion of students who carry guns on campus, and punish parents for such
acts by their children-as long as the statutes remain sufficiently related
to legitimate government interests.
1. Students' Rights to Education
A student has a legitimate claim of entitlement to a public education
if the state has established a public school system and requires its chil-
dren to attend. 164 This entitlement constitutes a property interest pro-
tected by the Due Process Clause.165 Therefore, expelling or suspending
a student for carrying a gun to school arguably conflicts with that stu-
dent's interest in obtaining an education. On the other hand, the state
also has a significant interest in excluding the student who brings a gun
to school, or at least in excluding the gun. 166 Further, because a student
does not have a fundamental right to education only an entitlement, a
regulation that may compromise a student's interest in that education
need only be rationally related to a legitimate state interest.' 67 Expelling
students who bring guns to school has been upheld as being rationally
related to the state's interest in providing an education. 168
2. Rights of Licensed Gun Owners
The regulation of guns in schools-particularly laws that criminal-
ize gun possession in a school zone-could arguably conflict with a gun
owner's interest in carrying an otherwise lawful firearm. The Second
Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, in part, that "the
right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed."' 69
164 All 50 states have compulsory education laws. See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 573-
74 (1975).
165 Id. at 574. See also Carey v. Maine Sch. Admin. Dist. No. 17, 754 F. Supp. 906, 918
(D. Me. 1990).
166 Carey, 754 F. Supp. at 918.
167 See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). See infra
notes 184-187 and accompanying text.
168 Mitchell v. Bd. of Trustees of Oxford Mun. Separate Sch. Dist., 625 F.2d 660 (5th Cir.
1980) (upholding rule mandating the automatic expulsion of any student bringing a knife or
other weapon to school as rationally related to the goal of providing a safe environment in
which children could learn). See also People v. Singer, 128 Cal. Rptr. 920 (1976). From a
procedural standpoint, the Due Process Clause requires fundamentally fair procedures, such as
notice and opportunity to be heard, before the student may be expelled or suspended. Id. "At
the very minimum, therefore, students facing suspension and the consequent interference with
a protected property interest must be given some kind of notice and afforded some kind of
hearing." Goss, 419 U.S. at 579 (holding that statute permitting suspension without a hearing
unconstitutional). See also Carey v. Maine Sch. Admin. Dist. No. 17, 754 F. Supp. 906 (D.
Me. 1990) (finding due process not violated in expelling student who brought semi-automatic
weapon to school).
169 The Second Amendment provides that "[a] well-regulated militia, being necessary to
the security of a free state, the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be in-
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The courts have consistently held, however, that the Second Amendment
does not preclude gun control laws affecting the private ownership, sale,
and use of firearms. 170 Courts have further held that the Second Amend-
fringed." U.S. CONST., amend. II (emphasis added). The meaning of the Second Amendment
is rooted in the concept of a "militia." Before the Constitution was adopted, each of the states
had its own militia. See Articles of Confederation, art. VI ("[E]very State shall always keep up
a well-regulated and disciplined militia, sufficiently armed and accoutred."); W. Rnai,
SoLDIERs OF THE STATES: THE ROLE OF THE NATIONAL GUARD iN AMRicAN DEmocRAcy 11-
12 (1957). When the Constitution established a permanent federal army of professional
soldiers, the colonists feared national standing armies, based on their recent experiences with
European monarchs, and believed that the continuation of the state militias was vital to their
security. See Keith Ehrman & Dennis Henigan, The Second Amendment in the Twentieth
Century: Have you Seen Your Militia Lately?, 15 U. DAYTON L. Rv. 5, 14-15 (1989). More-
over, the Constitution gave the federal government power over the arming of the militias, U.S.
CONST., ART. I, § 8, cl. 16, and many were concerned that the federal government could neu-
tralize the states' security by taking their arms. Ld. at 14-15. The Second Amendment was
thus adopted to provide citizens a right to maintain arms for the purpose of maintaining a "well
regulated Militia" of the state, which was still deemed "necessary to the security of a free
State." Id. In the 19th century, the states largely abandoned the concept of the state militia.
See id. at 36; Perpich v. Dep't of Defense, 496 U.S. 334, 341 (1989). Today there are no "state
armies," and the closest analogue to the "well-regulated Militia" is the National Guard. How-
ever, because National Guard weapons are not privately owned, the right to possess a firearm
no longer bears any relationship to preserving the militia contemplated by the Second Amend-
ment. See Henigan, supra note 169, at 14-15.
170 In United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939), the U.S. Supreme Court held that the
"obvious purpose" of the Second Amendment was "to assure the continuation and render pos-
sible the effectiveness" of the state militia, and that the amendment "must be interpreted and
applied with that end in view." Id. at 178. Since then, federal courts, including every circuit
court of appeals, have unanimously held that the Second Amendment guarantees a right to be
armed only to persons using the arms in service to an organized state militia. See, e.g., United
States v. Hale, 978 F.2d 1016, 1020 (8th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 997 (1993) ("[The]
purpose of the Second Amendment is to restrain the federal government from regulating the
possession of arms where such regulation would interfere with the preservation or efficiency of
the militia."); Thomas v. Members of the City Council of Portland, 730 F.2d 41, 42 (1st Cir.
1984); United States v. Toner, 728 F.2d 115, 128 (2d Cir. 1984); Quilici v. Village of Morton
Grove, 695 F.2d 261, 270 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 863 (1983) (It is "clear that
the right to bear arms is inextricably connected to the preservation of a militia. .. . [MAe
conclude that the right to keep and bear handguns is not guaranteed by the second amend-
ment."); United States v. Oakes, 564 F.2d 384, 387 (10th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S.
926 (1978); United States v. Johnson, 497 F.2d 548, 550 (4th Cir. 1974); Eckert v. City of
Philadelphia, 477 F.2d 610 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 839 (1973) ("It must be
remembered that the right to keep and bear arms is not a right given by the U.S. Constitu-
tion."); United States v. Day, 476 F.2d 562, 568 (6th Cir. 1973); United States v. Tomlin, 454
F.2d 176 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 924 (1972) (following Miller without discus-
sion); United States v. Johnson, 441 F.2d 1134, 1136 (5th Cir. 1971); United States v. Tot, 131
F.2d 261, 266 (3d Cir. 1942), rev'd on other grounds, 319 U.S. 463 (1943). Numerous state
courts have reached the same conclusion. See, e.g., Arnold v. Cleveland, 616 N.E.2d 163,
167-68 (Ohio 1993) ("[Court] decisions signify, and history supports the position, that the
amendment was drafted not with the primary purpose of guaranteeing the rights of individuals
to keep and bear arms but, rather, to allow Americans to possess arms to ensure the preserva-
tion of a militia."); Galvan v. Superior Court, 70 Cal. 2d 851, 866 (1969) ('The claim that
legislation regulating weapons violates the Second Amendment has been rejected by every
court which has ruled on the question."); Burton v. Sills, 248 A.2d 521, 526, 531 (N.J. 1968),
appeal dismissed, 394 U.S. 812 (1969) (Second Amendment "refers to the collective right 'of
1999] EFFECTS OF GuNs 311
ment was intended to protect and inure to the benefit of the states, and
therefore does not preclude gun regulation by state or local govern-
ment.171 Finally, because the Second Amendment does not grant a fun-
damental right to possess a gun, the regulation of gun possession within a
school zone need only be rationally related to the legitimate governmen-
tal purpose of maintaining education. 172 The state's interest in education
and safety, the large number of children in an area surrounding a school,
and the fact that regulating an area around a school makes it easier to
enforce a regulation within the school, suggest that creating a gun-free
zone is rationally related to a legitimate government interest.' 73
3. Parental Due Process Rights
Statutes imposing liability on parents if their children take guns to
school may conflict with the parents' due process rights. These statutes
are, however, roughly analogous to existing statutes that impose liability
on parents for damages caused to third parties by the willful or malicious
acts of their children. 174 Such laws are held to not violate the parents'
due process rights, 175 at least where there is a statutory ceiling on the
the people' to keep and bear arms in connection with a 'well regulated militia,"' meaning the
"active, organized militia of each state, which today is characterized as the state National
Guard" "Reasonable gun control legislation is clearly within the police power of the State and
must be accepted by the individual though it may impose a restraint or burden on him.").
171 Although the courts have chosen to apply many other Bill of Rights provisions to the
states through the Fourteenth Amendment, they have explicitly declined to do so with the
Second Amendment. See, e.g., Cases v. United States, 131 F.2d 916, 922-23 (1st Cir. 1942),
cert. denied, 319 U.S. 770 (1943); Fresno Rifle and Pistol Club, Inc. v. Van de Kamp, 746 F.
Supp. 1415, 1417-19 (E.D. Cal. 1990), affid, 965 F.2d 723 (9th Cir. 1992).
172 See People v. Singer, 56 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 1, 128 Cal. Rptr. 920 (1976).
173 I& Statutes creating a gun-free school zone typically exempt possession of a firearm
in a locked container or on private property. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 922(q) (1999); Cal. Pen.
Code § 626.9 (West 1998). Therefore, persons driving through the zone could carry an other-
wise lawful weapon if it were properly secured, and residents who live within the zone could
keep guns in their homes.
174 See, e.g., Cal. Civ. Code § 1714.1 (West 1998) (imposing civil liability on parent for
damages caused by unlawful act of child); Cal. Civ. Code § 1714.3 (West 1998) (imposing
civil liability for personal injury or property damage caused by the discharge of firearm by
minor, up to $30,000 per injury or death for one person or $60,000 per incident).
175 See First Bank Southeast, N.A. v. Bentkowski, 405 N.W.2d 764, 766 (Wis. Ct. App.
1987) (upholding parental liability statute holding parents liable for acts of child for damages
to property or personal injury attributable to willful, malicious or wanton act of child, not to
exceed $1,000); Rudnay v. Corbett, 374 N.E.2d 171, 174-75 (Ohio Ct. App. 1977) (affirming
parents responsible for up to $2,000 for property damages willfully caused by child); Watson
v. Gradzik, 373 A.2d 191, 193 (Conn. C.P. 1977) (stating parent liable for up to $1,500 for
child willfully or maliciously causing damage to property); In re Sorrell, 315 A.2d 110 (Md.
Ct. Spec. App. 1974); Mahaney v. Hunter Enters., Inc., 426 P.2d 442 (Wyo. 1967) (allowing
parent to be liable for up to $300 for children under 17 who maliciously and willfully damage
or destroy property); General Ins. Co. of Am. v. Faulkner, 130 S.E.2d 645 (N.C. Ct. App.
1963) (holding that parent can be liable for up to $500 for minor who maliciously or willfully
destroys property); Kelly v. Williams, 346 S.W.2d 434 (rex. Civ. App. 1961) (holding that
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amount of liability imposed. 176 Although such statutes have been justi-
fied on the ground that the injured parties would not otherwise be com-
pensated, 7 7 they have also been upheld on the ground that they motivate
parents to pay closer attention to their children and thereby deter juvenile
misconduct. 178
B. THE NEED FOR A FEDERAL MANDATE AND FEDERAL RESOURCES
TO PROTECT NATIONAL INTERESTS
States have the power to regulate gun possession in schools and,
as a general matter, would certainly not choose to promote the presence
of guns in classrooms or increase the death toll due to gun violence. Not
all state or local governments, however, have the economic resources
to effectively regulate guns in schools. In addition, some states may
be unwilling to enact effective legislation or devote sufficient resources
to enforcement. 179 As a result, a number of states do not have, or do not
parent can be liable for up to $300 for minor "who maliciously and willfully damages or
destroys property").
176 Compare cases cited supra note 175, with Corley v. Lewless, 182 S.E.2d 766, 770
(Ga. 1971) (finding statute deprived parents of property without due process of law because it
sought to provide compensation in full for property damage or personal injury; a statute impos-
ing a limit, on the other hand, amounts to a penal statute and is constitutional).
177 See, e.g., Bryan v. Kitamura, 529 F. Supp. 394, 399-400 (D. Haw. 1982);
Vanthournout v. Burge, 387 N.E.2d 341 (M1. App. Ct. 1979); Rudnay, 374 N.E.2d at 174-75.
178 See Kitamura, 529 F. Supp. at 399-400 (finding that statute making parents jointly
liable with their children for tortious acts is rationally related to state interest in providing a
remedy for tort victims who would otherwise receive no compensation. It also deters juvenile
delinquency by providing an incentive for parents to exercise greater supervision over their
children); Curry v. Superior Ct., 20 Cal. App. 4th 180, 185, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d 495, 498 (1993)
(deciding it is fair to impose liability on parent under Cal. Civ. Code § 1714.1 because parent
has duty to control, supervise and train the child); First Bank Southeast, 405 N.W.2d at 766
(stating that parental liability statute represents a valid exercise of state's police power in
giving parents a financial incentive to prevent their minor children from inflicting personal
injury and property damage, in that it is rationally related to the legitimate state interest in
curbing vandalism); Board of Educ. v. Caffiero, 431 A.2d 799, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1025
(1981) (holding statute making parent liable for damages for injury caused by child to school
property is rationally related to interest in compensating the public and deterring delinquent
behavior); Vanthournout, 387 N.E.2d at 341 (holding parent's liability for willful or malicious
acts is rationally related to interest in compensating innocent victims of juvenile misconduct,
and places obligation on parents to control a minor child); Rudnay, 374 N.E.2d at 174-75
(finding statute making parents responsible for property damage willfully caused by child is
rationally related to government purpose of compensating innocent victims of property dam-
age, and might also tend to curb juvenile delinquency by rendering parents jointly and sever-
ally liable for the willful misconduct of their minor children); General Ins. Co. of Am. v.
Faulkner, 130 S.E.2d 645, 650 (1963) (holding that "parental liability for harm done by chil-
dren will stimulate attention and supervision" and prevent juvenile delinquency).
179 As described by one sponsor of the Gun Free School Zones Act:
[Not every state has a law [prohibiting taking a gun to school]. And not every state
law is adequately drafted to do the job. For example, Alabama only prohibits bring-
ing a gun to school with the intent to cause bodily harm. . . . And in Alabama you
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agressively enforce, any laws prohibiting guns at school.180 Further-
more, while the warning signs of violent youth are known, 181 states often
do not have sufficient resources to help the troubled youth who may be
prone to gun violence.' 8 2
In short, the states may simply be unable to address the problem of
guns in school without additional resources. Because the states have no
legal obligation to eliminate guns in schools, and because important fed-
eral interests hang in the balance, federal legislation may be appropriate.
1. States Have No Federal Constitutional Obligation to Protect
Students from Gun Violence
A state generally has greater incentive to address a danger within its
borders if it is subject to liability for that danger, or if it is subject to an
injunction or other order requiring it to do so. However, while a student
has an interest in obtaining an education and an interest in being safe
from harm, these interests are not sufficient to compel enactment of leg-
islation exposing a state to liability for school violence.
A student's interest in receiving an education is adversely affected
by guns and gun violence in the classroom, 8 3 and while education is not
a fundamental constitutional right,184 the denial of an education alto-
can bring a gun to a private school without any worries. In other states, the maxi-
mum penalty for an adult who brings a gun into school is only one year.
(statement of Sen. Herb Kohl, July 18, 1995, Federal Document Clearing House, Inc).
180 In his Lopez concurrence, Justice Kennedy reported that 40 states had outlawed the
possession of firearms on or near school grounds. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 581
(1995). The remaining states were Alabama, Delaware, Hawaii, Iowa, Louisiana, Montana,
New Hampshire, Wisconsin and Wyoming.
181 Warning signs of violence include cruelty to animals, preference for violent entertain-
ment, angry essays or artwork, history of uncontrollable outbursts, suicide threats, and sudden
behavioral changes. Lori Olszewski & Elaine Herscher, Support Services Thin, But Kids Can
Be Helped, S.F. CHRON., April 22, 1999, at A5 (citing National School Safety Center and
therapists); National School Safety Center, <www.nsscl.org/reporter/checklist.htm> (visited
April 17, 1999). The students who massacred their peers in Littleton, Colorado, were de-
scribed as intelligent and from an upscale community, but they also displayed a number of
warning signs: they were fascinated with Hitler and Nazi paraphernalia, filmed videos of them-
selves shooting high powered weapons, threatened to kill people, talked about bombs, consist-
ently dressed in black, operated a hate-talk web site, played violent video games, and listened
to songs of oppression, revenge and violence. Id. See Kevin Fagan & Jaxon Van Derbeken,
Eerie Hints of the Outcasts' Dark Side, S.F. CHRoN., April 22, 1999, at Al, A4.
182 While 20% of children and adolescents have a behavioral, emotional or mental health
problem, two-thirds of them do not get the help they need. See Olszewski & Herscher, supra
note 181, at A5 (reporting statistics from the U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Services).
183 See supra notes 1-12.
184 See, e.g., Kadrmas v. Dickinson Public Schools et al, 487 U.S. 450, 464 (1988) (find-
ing that state and local legislation resulting in some North Dakota school districts providing
free transportation to some students to their local public school, while other districts in the
state conditioned such transportation on payment of a fee, did not violate the equal protection
clause because it was rationally related to a legitimate government purpose); San Antonio Ind.
Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 55 (1973) (applying rational basis test, state statutory
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gether is unconstitutional. 18 5 Therefore, some level of educational Op-
portunity, such as the opportunity to acquire "basic minimal skills," may
be constitutionally protected. 186 The difficulty with succeeding on such
a claim, however, is that although gun violence in some schools seriously
impedes students' learning and causes truancy, it is hard to prove that it
altogether prevents them from acquiring "basic minimal skills." Further-
more, unlike a statute precluding a class of children from attending
school, 187 or a statutory scheme precluding students from educational op-
portunities, 188 the state's failure to control school violence is merely a
failure to address a situation caused by third parties.
scheme financing schools with local property taxes did not violate equal protection clauses).
The significance of education being a fundamental right is in the standard by which an in-
fringement of that right is evaluated. Id. at 17. In determining whether a statute violates the
Equal Protection Clause, the court requires that there be a reasonable relationship to a legiti-
mate public purpose. Id. at 40. A higher standard applies if that statute disadvantages a "sus-
pect class," or impinges on a "fundamental right." Id. In those instances, there must be a
showing that the legislation was narrowly tailored to fulfill a compelling state interest. ld.; see
Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 217 (1982), reh'g denied, 458 U.S. 1131 (1982). Some classifica-
tions trigger intermediate scrutiny, requiring a showing that the law furthers a substantial state
interest. Plyer, 457 U.S. at 217-18.
185 In Plyler a Texas statute withheld from local school districts state funds for the educa-
tion of children who were not legal admittees to the United States. IL The statute also author-
ized school districts to deny enrollment to those children. Although the Court recognized that
education was not a fundamental right, the Court found that the statute had to be justified by a
showing that it justified "some substantial state interest," id. at 230, because the denial of an
education imposed a lifelong hardship and a stigma of illiteracy and deprived the children of
any opportunity to advance their personal and economic interests. Id. at 223-24. See Kadrmas,
487 U.S. at 450, 459 (holding that application of Plyler should be limited to facts in Plyler
because it represented a unique situation involving the total denial of education to a group of
children resident in the state as well as a penalty on children for the illegal conduct of their
parents).
186 In San Antonio Ind Sch. District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973), the Supreme Court
considered an equal protection challenge to a state statutory system that financed primary and
secondary education with local property taxes. Because of disparate property values in the
school district, some areas in the district had more funds than others to spend per student on
educational programs and resources. In upholding the statutory system, the Court rejected the
argument that education should be deemed a fundamental right based on its relationship to
fundamental freedoms of speech and voting. Id. at 35-36. This is because citizens are not
guaranteed the most effective participation in the public process. Id. Without excluding the
possibility that some level of educational opportunity might be constitutionally protected, the
Court upheld the statute because there was no indication that the system failed to provide the
students with "an opportunity to acquire the basic minimal skills'" Id. at 37; see Papasan v.
Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 285 (1986) (using rational relationship standard to review disparities in
the funding of educational school districts, but noting that the "Court has not yet definitively
settled the questions whether a minimally adequate education is a fundamental right and
whether a statute alleged to discriminatorily infringe that right should be accorded heightened
equal protection review").
187 See Plyler, 457 U.S. at 202.
188 See San Antonio Ind Sch. District, 411 U.S. at 1.
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A student's interest in freedom from harm is also adversely affected
by gun violence in schools. 189 The Fourteenth Amendment, which pro-
vides that no "State shall deprive any person of life [or] liberty... with-
out due process of law,"'190 protects children as well as adults. 191 This
due process right includes a liberty interest in the avoidance of personal
harm. 192 In the landmark case of DeShaney v. Winnebago County De-
partment of Social Services,193 however, the Supreme Court determined
that an individual generally does not have a due process right to protec-
tion by the state, even if the state knows the individual is in danger.194
Subsequent decisions have concluded that a state may have a duty to
protect an individual, but only if the state created the danger,195 or the
state placed the individual in a custodial relationship and implicitly as-
sumed responsibility for his or her protection. 196
The rule set forth in DeShaney has been held to preclude liability for
gun violence in schools. In Johnson v. Dallas Independent School Dis-
189 The issue has been examined in cases brought against school personnel under the
federal civil rights enforcement statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1999). Under § 1983, a plaintiff
must allege, among other things, that his or her constitutional rights were violated by a state
actor. School employees are state actors in this context.
190 U.S. CoNsr. amend. XIV.
191 See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Cent Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74o(1976)
("Constitutional rights do not mature and come into being magically only when one attains the
state-defined age of majority. Minors, as well as adults, are protected by the Constitution and
possess constitutional rights."); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) ("Accordingly, while these
cases relate only to restricted aspects of [constitutional rights], they unmistakably indicate that,
whatever may be their precise impact, neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill of
Rights is for adults alone.").
192 See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 674-76 (1977) (holding that child has liberty
interest in avoidance of physical harm, but administrative safeguards relating to corporal pun-
ishment in schools falls within the area of educational responsibility that lies primarily with the
schools).
193 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
194 See id. DeShaney is the seminal case on the state's obligation to protect a child. In
DeShaney, the Wisconsin Department of Social Services had received several reports that a
four year-old boy was suffering abuse by his father. Id. The state failed to remove the boy
from his father's custody, and the father beat the boy so severely that he suffered permanent
brain damage. Id. The Supreme Court held that, even when the state knows that the person is
in imminent danger of harm, "nothing in the language of the Due Process Clause itself requires
the State to protect the life, liberty and property of its citizens against invasion by private
actors.' Id. at 195.
195 See, e.g., Wood v. Ostrander, 879 F.2d 583 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 938,
(1990) (involving a female passenger raped after a police officer arrested the intoxicated
driver, impounded his car, and left the passenger alone at night in a known high-crime area);
K.H. ex rel. Murphy v. Morgan, 914 F.2d 846 (7th Cir. 1990) (involving 16 month-old child
molested and abused in numerous foster homes after being removed by state from parents'
custody).
196 See, e.g., DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 199-200. In dictum, the Court noted that a duty of
protection may arise if the state imposes limitations upon an individual to act on his or her own
behalf "through incarceration, institutionalization, or other similar restraint of personal lib-
erty." Id. at 200. Thus, if "the State takes a person into its custody and holds him there against
his will," it assumes a constitutionally-mandated duty of protection. Id. at 199-200.
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trict,197 a nonstudent rode a school bus to a Dallas high school and
walked into a school building without a required student identification
badge. He was carrying a concealed firearm, which was not discovered
because the school's metal detectors were not in use. He then created a
disturbance, pulled out the gun and starting firing it, killing a bystanding
student who was struck in the head by a stray bullet. 198
The Fifth Circuit held that there was no state-created danger
because the school had not taken any affirmative, culpable action
placing the boy in danger or depriving him of the ability to de-
fend himself or obtain private aid. 199 The court further found that
compulsory attendance laws do not create a custodial relationship,
because parents may withdraw their children from public school and
place them in private schools,200 and because parents, at
any rate, remain the principal caretakers of their children. 201
Under this analysis, the Constitution2° does not require a state
197 38 F.3d 198 (5th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1017 (1995).
198 The boy's father brought suit under 42 U.S.C § 1983 (1995), alleging that the school
violated the boy's constitutional rights by creating the hazardous environment at school which
resulted in his son's death and, alternatively, that the school had violated an affirmative duty
arising out of the state's compulsory attendance laws. Id.
199 Id. at 201. The court suggested that a claim could not be stated unless previous crimi-
nal conduct at the high school made the school a "high-crime area" and unless school officials
had affirmatively committed a culpable act with actual knowledge that the high school was
dangerous. lId
200 lId at 203. However, private schooling is not an available option for many families.
As the court in Johnson acknowledged, most parents cannot afford to place their children in
private schools. Id. at 203 n.7. Furthermore, some courts have held that a state may forbid
home instruction as a substitute to attending public schools. Duro v. District Attorney, 712
F.2d 96, 99 (4th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1006 (1984).
201 Johnson, 38 F.3d at 203. Other courts have held that compulsory school attendance
laws are insufficient to create a custodial relationship that would trigger the state's duty to
protect the student. See, e.g., Dorothy J. v. Little Rock School Dist., 7 F.3d 729, 732 (8th Cir.
1993) ("[S]tate-mandated school attendance does not entail so restrictive a custodial relation-
ship as to impose upon the State the same duty to protect it owes to prison inmates."); Maldo-
nado v. Josey, 975 F.2d 727, 732 (10th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 914 (1993)
("[Clompulsory attendance laws do not create an affirmative constitutional duty to protect
students from the private actions of third parties while they attend school."); D.R. v. Middle
Bucks Area Vocational Technical Sch., 972 F.2d 1364 (3d Cir. 1992) (en banc) (compulsory
attendance laws do not create special relationship), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1079; J.O. v. Alton
Community Unit. Sch. Dist., 909 F.2d 267, 272-73 (7th Cir. 1990) ("Schoolchildren are not
like mental patients and prisoners such that the State has an affirmative duty to protect them.").
202 There may be other claims against the state, such as alleged common law negligence.
See Deshaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services, 489 U.S. 189, 201-02
(1989) (holding that a state may acquire a duty of care under state tort law by voluntarily
undertaking to protect the child). For example, as a result of their physical custody of the
student, school officials have been held to have a duty to exercise the same care that a reason-
able parent would exercise. See, e.g., Gary on Behalf of Gary v. Meche, 626 So.2d 901, 903
(La. Ct. App. 1993) (holding school officials liable when an unsupervised first grader ran out
of the schoolyard and was hit by a truck). See Brum v. Town of Dartmouth, 690 N.E.2d 844
(Mass. 1998) (finding no § 1983 claim because student murdered by private actors and school
had no constitutional obligation to protect him, but holding that plaintiff could pursue claim for
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to protect its students from gun violence.20 3
2. Federal Interests Regarding Guns in Schools
While there exists no consitutional obligation for the state to elimi-
nate guns and violence from schools, the existence of each touches upon
several federal interests. First, the effect of violence on education is a
national concern, because of the established relationship between the
quality of education and the country's economic competitiveness. 20 4
Congress has repeatedly acknowledged the connection between primary
and secondary education, a skilled work force, and the nation's position
in the global economy.205 In addition, researchers reported to the World
Bank, in 1990, that:
[t]here is now a persuasive body of theoretical and em-
pirical evidence that investment in the formal education
and training of the labor force plays a crucial role in eco-
nomic development... [and] The results of these stud-
ies suggest that in both developed and developing
negligent failure to provide security). In addition, the California Constitution provides that
"All students and staff of public primary, elementary, junior high and senior high schools have
the inalienable right to attend campuses which are safe, secure and peaceful." Cal. Const., art.
I, see. 28(c). See Leger v. Stockton Unified Sch. Dist., 202 Cal. App. 3d 1448, 249 Cal. Rptr.
688 (1988) (section 28(c) does not provide a right to sue for damages, but negligence theory
many).
203 Even where the school has actual knowledge that a particular person is in danger of
being harmed, it may have no duty to act. See Graham v. Independent School District, 22 F.3d
991 (10th Cir. 1994) (finding no § 1983 claim where student was murdered after school dis-
trict employees received warnings that another student who had threatened violence against
him was on school grounds with a gun, because compulsory school attendance laws do not
create a duty to protect students even where violence is foreseeable); Thames v. Kimbrough,
1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6581 (N.D. M. 1991) (holding that allegations that from 1987 through
1989 there were 554 reported confiscations of weapons in the school system, including eleven
weapons violations at the subject high school, were insufficient to state a claim). Cf. Walton v.
Alexander, 20 F.3d 1350 (5th Cir.), reh'g en banc granted, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 16495 (5th
Cir. July 1, 1994) (finding that school had affirmative duty to protect students at public board-
ing school for deaf children); Spivey v. Elliott, 29 F.3d 1522 (11th Cir. 1994) (same). In
Walton and Spivey, the child was in the state's full-time care. But see Pagano v. Massapequa
Public Schools, 714 F. Supp. 641, 641-43 (E.D.N.Y. 1989) (holding that elementary school
student's allegations of school official's failure to prevent continuing attacks stated duty to
student and § 1983 claim, because compulsory school attendance laws give rise to some duty
of care and indifference to repeated attacks could be considered deliberate).
204 See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 602 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
205 l See, e.g., Augustus F. Hawkins-Robert T. Stafford Elementary and Secondary
School Improvement Amendments, Pub. L. No. 100-297, 102 Stat. 130; S. Rep. No. 222,
100th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1987), at 3, 8, 16, 41, 63, 65-66, 75, 82, 85; The Education and
Training for a Competitive America Act of 1988, enacted as Title VI of the Omnibus Trade
and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, Title VI, 102 Stat. 1107, 1469 ("func-
tionally or technologically illiterate [workers] erode the nation's standing in the international
marketplace"); School Dropout Prevention and Basic Skills Improvement Act of 1990, Pub. L.
No. 101-600, 104 Stat. 3042.
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countries, educational investment has been one of the
most important factors contributing to economic
growth .... 206
Historically, education has been critical to our national economy.
Nearly a quarter of America's increase in economic growth between
1929 and 1957 was due to the increased education of its labor force.207
Education contributed to eleven percent of the total economic growth in
the United States between 1948 and 1973.208 Schooling also makes
more productive workers.2°9 Thus, although:
education is principally a State and local responsibil-
ity,. . . there is also the national problem of our ability to
cope generally with rapidly changing technology and
changing labor-force requirements, and a pressing
national need to improve our international economic
competitiveness. These national concerns demand a re-
sponse at the federal level.210
Second, due to the extensive mobility of American citizens, defi-
ciencies in the quality of education in one state can affect the quality of
education in other states. In a single year, between two and four percent
of children below the age of eighteen-over a million boys and girls-
move to a different state.21' Students with inadequate educational back-
grounds who transfer schools may adversely affect the level of education
in their new school by slowing the progress of the class as a whole.
Moreover, the high degree of guns and gun violence in some urban
schools may discourage travel to those areas, thus restricting interstate
travel.212
206 WADI D. HADDAD ET AL., WORLD BANK DISCUSSION PAPERS, EDUCATION AND DEvErL-
OPMEN'r: EVIDENCE FOR Nsw PRIOITIES 3 (1990).
207 LEwIs C. SOLOMON, THm QuALTY OF EDUCATION AND ECONOMIC GROWTH: A RE_
VIEW OF THE LrIERATURE, IN THE QuALrry OF EDUCATION AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 12-
13 (Stephen P. Heyneman and Daphne Siev White, eds. 1986).
208 DALE JORGENSON, THE CoNTImmTON OF EDUCATION TO U.S. EONOMIC GROWTH,
1948-73, IN EDUCATION AND ECONOMIC PRoDucrIvrrY (Edwin Dean, ed. 1984).
209 CHRISTOPHER COLDOUGH, PRIMARY SCHOOLING AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: A RE-
VIEW OF THE EVIDENCE, WORLD BANK STAFF WORKNG PAPER No. 399 (1980).
210 See Education for Economic Security Act: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Educa-
tion, Arts and Humanities of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 98th Cong. 1
(1983) (statement of Sen. Stafford).
211 KR!STIN A. HANSEN, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS 20-
473, GEOGRAPHICAL MOBE.Ty: MARCH 1991 TO MARCH 1992, 7, tbl.1 (1993).
212 Cf. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. Unites States, 379 U.S. 241, 300 (1964) (stating
that racial discrimination in certain geographical areas may discourage travel to those areas,
thus affecting interstate travel).
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Third, each year the federal government gives billions of dollars to
states for public schooling.2 13 Since the federal government contributes
substantial funds to education, 214 it has an interest in assuring that such
funds are used effectively.
Fourth, the economic cost of gun violence in schools is a national
concern. Over eighty percent of hospitalization costs are borne by public
funds, which include federally-sponsored programs, such as MediCal
(Medicaid) and MediCare.215 And most of the balance of hospitalization
costs, as well as the fees of doctors and other professionals, are borne by
interstate concerns such as private insurance companies, workers' com-
pensation insurance providers, and health maintenance organizations.216
Fifth, the presence of guns in schools is tied to, and is perhaps a
critical part of, an interstate gun trade. Gun traffickers buy guns in states
that have relatively lenient gun-buying restrictions, smuggle them into
localities with stricter gun control laws, and sell them at a profit.2 17
Schools have become a significant site for such gun sales,218 and the
guns that are sold in schools have likely crossed state lines.219 Because
guns are transported across state lines, and firearm regulations vary from
state to state, the federal government has a strong interest in national
uniform regulations curbing the availability of firearms.220
213 See Hearings on S. 890, supra note 126, at 37 (statement of Sen. Arlen Specter)
214 See Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528, 553 (1985).
215 See supra notes 86-87.
216 Id. See United States v. Evans, 928 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1991) (finding that posses-
sion of firearms adversely affects the national economy, at least through interstate insurance
companies).
217 Witkin, supra note 2, at 28 ("In cities with strong gun-control laws, like Boston, New
York and Washington, weapons are imported and resold at a profit by traffickers who purchase
them in states that until recently have had few gun-buying restrictions: Florida, Texas, Vir-
ginia, Georgia and Ohio."). See Isikoff, infra note 219.
218 See supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text.
219 One out of every four traceable guns in New York City was bought in Virginia; one in
three traceable guns in Washington, D.C. was also bought in Virginia. Lorraine Woellert,
Gotham's Guns Come From Virginia, WASH. Tnvms, Dec. 30, 1992, at Al. Four California
firearms manufacturers provided 40% of the handguns seized by Denver police from gang
members in 1993. John C. Ensslin, Denver's Gang Arsenal, RocKY MotmrNr~N NEws,
March 13, 1994, at F20A. A study by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms in De-
troit, Michigan found that the gun most frequently used in Detroit's serious crimes was manu-
factured in California. Id. at F22A. According to the Violence Policy Center, a gun-control
advocacy group in Washington, D.C., these California guns are the favorites of drug traffickers
and youth. Id. Indeed, the interstate activity of gangs has apparently fueled interstate trans-
portation of guns. The "Crips" and the "Bloods" from Southern California have loose affilia-
tions in 32 states and 113 cities across the United States. Id.; see Witkin, supra, note 2, at 28.
See also Michael Isikoff, Gun Pipeline: From Ohio to Streets of Philadelphia, WASH. POST,
Mar. 12, 1991, Al-A4.
220 See Karl P. Adler et al., Firearm Violence and Public Health; Limiting the Availability
of Guns, 271 JAMA 1281, 1281- 83 (1994).
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3. Other Reasons for Federal Regulation
Other arguments support federal regulation or resources (or both)
supplementing the laws and resources of the states. Federal regulation
signals national resolve and may attract greater attention to the problem
of guns in schools. Additional legislation and publicity may increase
public knowledge about the potential punishment for gun possession,
creating the perception that violators will be apprehended and punished.
Such a perception would increase disincentives to bringing guns to
school, thereby increasing the possibility of deterrence.221 Even if the
federal law duplicates existing state laws, state and federal law enforce-
ment may share the costs and burden of prosecuting those who take guns
to school.222 Due to their greater resources, the federal system provides
advantages in the prosecution of more serious offenders.223
In sum, although the states traditionally have authority over schools
and controlling gun violence, there is room for federal regulation as well.
Significant federal interests in education, the national economy, and in-
terstate gun trafficking are at stake, and states often do not have the re-
sources to tackle the task effectively. Supplementing state regulation
with federal resources and federal regulations, therefore, may serve the
dual purpose of alleviating the burden on state law enforcement and es-
tablishing the protection of students as a national priority.
IV. FEDERAL POWER UNDER THE COMMERCE CLAUSE
AND SPENDING CLAUSE TO REGULATE GUNS IN SCHOOLS
Unlike state governments, the federal government only has the pow-
ers delegated to it by the Constitution.224 Thus, although the federal gov-
ernment has an interest in activities that transcend state borders, affect
the national economy, or otherwise have interstate ramifications, it may
not have the power to regulate those activities. This section examines
whether federal legislation affecting guns in schools-including the
amended Gun-Free School Zones Act, the federal ban on sales of guns to
juveniles, the Gun-Free Schools Act, and the Safe Schools Act-is justi-
221 See supra notes 94-103 and accompanying text.
222 Hearings on S. 890, supra note 126, at 3 (statement of Sen. Herb Kohl). State and
federal prosecutors work together in prosecuting other crimes that could be chargeable under
either federal or state law, such as drug offenses and other crimes. ML
223 In comparing the Texas state criminal system with the federal system, the federal
system does not permit bonds for individuals who are a threat to the community, provides
tougher sentences, requires those convicted to serve a higher percentage of the sentence, does
not offer parole, and mandates supervision after release from prison See Hearings on S. 890,
supra note 126, at 9 (statement of Robert Wortham, U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District of
Texas)
224 See U.S. CoNsT., ART. I, § 8; U.S. CONST., amend. X.
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fled under either the Constitution's Commerce Clause225 or Spending
Clause.22
6
A. COMMERCE CLAUSE POWER
The U. S. Constitution delegates to Congress the power "to regulate
Commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States, and with
the Indian Tribes.122 7 The issue, then, is whether an activity that Con-
gress has undertaken to regulate may be deemed "Commerce... among
the several states." The Supreme Court initially construed the Com-
merce Clause narrowly, precluding Congress from regulating activities
that were not actually interstate purchases or sales.228 As the scope of
the nation's commerce subsequently expanded, however, so did the
Court's construction of the commerce power.229
Today, the Commerce Clause is held to empower Congress to enact
legislation with respect to any activities substantially affecting interstate
commerce.230 Congress may, therefore, regulate interstate activities, in-
trastate activities that have a substantial relationship to interstate com-
merce by their economic effect, and intrastate activities that must be
regulated to effectuate regulation of interstate commerce.23'
225 U.S. CONST., ART. I, § 8, cl. 3.
226 U.S. CONST., ART. I, § 8, cl. 1.
227 U.S. CoNsr., ART. I, § 8, cl. 3. See also Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 194-95 (1824)
("The genius and character of the whole government seem to be, that its action is to be applied
to all the ... internal concerns [of the Nation] which affect the States generally.").
228 See, e.g., United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 12 (1895) (finding that manu-
facturing is not commerce); Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 304 (1936) (finding that
mining is not commerce).
229 The Supreme Court has found, for example, that the commerce power reached intra-
state activities that were so closely and substantially connected to interstate commerce that
their control was necessary for Congress to regulate interstate commerce effectively. See, e.g.,
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937) (upholding National Labor Rela-
tions Act); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 118 (1941) (upholding Fair Labor Standards
Act). Perhaps the broadest construction of the Commerce Clause is found in Wickard v. Fil-
bum, 317 U.S. 111 (1942); see infra note 231. Under the Agricultural Adjustment Act of
1938, which was intended to regulate commerce in wheat to avoid fluctuation of wheat prices,
an Ohio farmer was assessed a penalty for harvesting too much wheat. The court held that
Congress may regulate an individual's harvesting and storage of wheat because, when that
activity is combined with the similar conduct of others, it "exerts a substantial economic effect
on interstate commerce.' Wickard, 317 U.S. at 125.
230 See, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 252-58 (1964).
231 See, e.g., Fry v. Unites States, 421 U.S. 542, 547 (1975) ("Even activity that is purely
intrastate in character may be regulated by Congress, where the activity, combined with like
conduct by others similarly situated, affects commerce among the states or with foreign na-
tions.'); Wickard, 317 U.S. at 111 (finding individual's intrastate production and consumption
of home grown wheat subject to regulation where his contribution, taken together with that of
many others, exerts a substantial effect on interstate commerce); United States v. Wrightwood
Dairy Co., 315 U.S. 110, 119 (1942); Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. at 30-31 (up-
holding National Labor Relations Act because Congress may regulate intrastate activities hav-
ing such a close and substantial relation to interstate commerce that their control is appropriate
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1. Congress' Regulation of Firearms Under the Commerce
Clause Before United States v. Lopez23 2
Under its power to regulate commerce, Congress has enacted nu-
merous statutes regulating firearms. 23 3 The sum of these regulations is,
for the most part, now codified at §§ 921-928 in Title 18 of the United
States Code.23 4 Among other things, § 922 prohibits interstate transac-
tions by nonlicensed dealers;235 selling firearms to non-citizens, drug ad-
dicts, mental defectives and felons;23 6 dealing in stolen firearms;237
transporting in interstate commerce a firearm with an obliterated serial
number;238 importing firearms;239 transporting, possessing or dealing in
machine guns,2 40 undetectable firearms, 24 1 or assault weapons; 242 trans-
ferring firearms without a criminal background check;24 3 and selling fire-
arms to juveniles. 244
Courts have also upheld other federal firearm regulations against
Commerce Clause challenges. In United States v. Miller,245 the Supreme
Court upheld a provision in the National Firearms Act of 1934 prohibit-
ing the transportation in interstate commerce of certain unregistered shot-
guns. There the Court concluded that the statute did not usurp the
"police power reserved to the states. '24 6 However, Miller involved a
to protect commerce from burdens). See ROTUNDA & NowAK, TREATISE ON CoNSnTUoNA
LAW, SUBSTANCE AND PROcEDURE 2ND, § 4.9 at 404-05.
232 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
233 In 1968, Congress passed the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968,
Pub. L. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197 (1968) [hereinafter the 1968 Act]. Title IV of the 1968 Act
repealed the Federal Firearms Act and enacted 18 U.S.C. §§ 921-928. Title VII of the 1968
Act enacted new provisions at 18 U.S.C. § 1201. In the Firearms Owners' Protection Act of
1986, Pub. L. 99-308, 100 Stat. 449, Title VII of the 1968 Act (18 U.S.C. 1201) was repealed
and most of the provisions incorporated, in substance, into 18 U.S.C. § 922. It also added
present § 922(o), banning the transfer or possession of machine guns unless possessed before
the effective date of the law. The Undetectable Firearms Act of 1988, Pub. L. 100-649, 102
Stat. 3816, added § 922(p) making it unlawful to deal, possess or receive a firearm that was
not detectable by a metal detector. See also Federal Firearms Act of 1938, former 15 U.S.C.
§ 901(3). Under its taxing power, Congress enacted the National Firearms Act of 1934, for-
mer 26 U.S.C. § 5845(a) (excise tax on sales of machine guns, sawed off shotguns and rifles).
See U.S. CONsT. art. 1, § 8 (granting the power to tax).
234 18 U.S.C. §§ 921-928 (1999). See also 18 U.S.C. § 924(h) (outlawing transfer of
firearms with knowledge it will be used in a crime of violence or drug trafficking crime).
235 18 U.S.C. § 922(a) (1999).
236 Id. § 922(d).
237 Id. § 922(j).
238 Id. § 922(k).
239 Id. § 922(1).
240 Id. § 922(o).
241 Id § 922(p).
242 Id. § 922(v).
243 Id. § 922(t).
244 Id. § 922(x).
245 307 U.S. 174 (1939).
246 Id. at 177 (1939) (citing Sonzinsky v. Unites States, 300 U.S. 506, 513 (1937)).
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statute that was specifically related to interstate commerce, and thus os-
tensibly within Congress' Commerce Clause authority. The mere pos-
session of guns (at or near a school, or otherwise), as opposed to other
interstate transportation, is less clearly linked to interstate commerce.
Circuit Courts of Appeal have addressed regulations of the mere
possession of firearms, upholding 18 U.S.C. § 922(o), which bans the
possession of machine guns unless the guns were lawfully possessed
before the effective date of the subsection. In United States v. Hale,247
the Eighth Circuit reasoned that both the statute and legislative history
indicated that Congress had considered the relationship between the
availability of machine guns and violent crime. The Hale Court was also
persuaded that Congress had previously found a relationship between
firearm regulation and interstate commerce. In United States v. Evans,248
the Ninth Circuit found it reasonable for Congress to conclude that fire-
arm possession represents a class of activities affecting interstate com-
merce, due to the affects of gun violence on the national economy.249 In
both of these cases, the courts determined that the mere possession of a
firearm was sufficiently linked to interstate commerce to fall within Con-
gress' Commerce Clause power, even though the firearm had not neces-
sarily moved in interstate commerce.
Prior to Lopez, the Supreme Court had not addressed the permissi-
ble scope of federal regulation regarding the mere possession of firearms.
The Court did examine the issue indirectly, however, in several cases
challenging convictions obtained under federal firearm laws. In United
States v. Bass,250 the Court interpreted Title VII of the Omnibus Crime
Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (the "1968 Act"), former 18 U.S.C.
§ 1201, to determine the elements necessary for a conviction of gun pos-
session by a felon. The 1968 Act made it unlawful for any felon to
"receive[ ], possess[ ], or transport[ ] in commerce or affecting com-
merce" any firearm. 51 Because the "in commerce or affecting com-
merce" language could have been read to apply only to the crime of
transporting a firearm, the issue in Bass was whether the government had
to prove a connection to interstate commerce where the crime was fire-
arm possession. The Court concluded that the statute required proof of a
connection to commerce, and left open "the question whether, upon ap-
247 978 F.2d 1016, 1018 (8th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 997 (1993).
248 928 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1991).
249 Federal firearm regulations have also been upheld against challenges under the Second
Amendment and the equal protection clause. See supra note 170 and accompanying text (Sec-
ond Amendment); United States v. Sherbondy, 865 F.2d 996 (9th Cir. 1988) (finding that
statute criminalizing possession by felon did not violate equal protection clause because Con-
gress could rationally conclude that felony conviction was sufficient basis).
250 404 U.S. 336 (1971).
251 18 U.S.C. § 1201 (1968).
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propriate findings, Congress can constitutionally punish the 'mere pos-
session' of firearms. '25 2 In subsequent cases, the Supreme Court
concluded that the required movement in interstate commerce could have
occurred at any time, even before the felon received the firearm.253
2. The Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 and United States v.
Lopez
The Gun-Free School Zones Act (the "Act")254 was enacted as part
of the Crime Control Act of 1990.255 The Act provided, in pertinent part:
"It shall be unlawful for any individual knowingly to possess a firearm at
a place that the individual knows, or has reasonable cause to believe, is a
school zone."25 6 The Act defined "school zone" to mean on, or within
1,000 feet of, the grounds of a public, parochial or private school which
provides elementary or secondary education. 25 7
The Act thus criminalized the mere possession of a firearm within a
certain geographic location, without any requirement that the firearm
have travelled in interstate commerce. When passing the Act, Congress
was plainly aware of the problems of gun violence in schools 25 8 but did
252 Bass, 404 U.S. at 339 n.4.
253 See Scarborough v. Unites States, 431 U.S. 576, (1977) (upholding conviction under
18 U.S.C. § 1202(a) (now 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)), prohibiting possession of a firearm by a felon,
because the conviction required proof that the firearm had been in interstate commerce "at
some time"); Barrett v. Unites States, 423 U.S. 213 (1976) (upholding conviction under 18
U.S.C. § 922(h), banning possession of a firearm by a felon, even though the firearm had
moved independently of the felon's receipt). Bass, Barrett, and Scarborough were cases in
which the court was called upon to interpret a statute, not to determine whether Congress had
sufficient power to enact it. Nevertheless, the court's interpretation was guided by the parame-
ters of federal power in relation to the states.
254 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(2)(A) (1994).
255 Pub. L. No.101-647, 104 Stat. 4789-4968.
256 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(1)(A) (1994). Section 922(q)(1)(B), now § 922(q)(2)(B), provided
exceptions where (1) possession of the firearm was on private property, not part of school
grounds, (2) the person possessing the firearm was licensed to do so, (3) the firearm was
unloaded and in a locked container or secured rack in a motor vehicle, (4) the firearm was for
use in a school-approved program, pursuant to contract, or by a law enforcement officer, or
(5) the firearm was unloaded and possessed by an individual crossing the zone in order to gain
access to hunting grounds.
257 ld. at § 921(a)(25), (26).
258 The sponsor of the Act, Sen. Kohl, described the effects of gun violence on schoolchil-
dren in this way:
[Olver the past few years we have witnessed a shocking number of attacks against
our children as they sat in the classroom and played in the schoolyard. The National
School Safety Center estimates that more than 100,000 students carry guns to school
every day, and that more than a quarter of a million students brought a handgun to
school at least once in 1987. . . [Slome parents are now dressing their children in
bullet-proof vests before sending them off to school. It's a sad and frightening com-
mentary that violence in our schools and on our streets has reached such a level that
there's a market for these products.
136 CONG. REc. S17595 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990).
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not make any specific findings that linked those problems to interstate
commerce.259
Having skirted the issue of Commerce power over the mere posses-
sion of a gun in United States v. Bass,2 60 the Supreme Court addressed
the issue and the Act head-on in United States v. Lopez.261 In Lopez, a
twelfth-grade high school student was caught at school with a .38 caliber
handgun and five bullets, which he maintained someone had given him
to deliver to someone else for use in a gang war. Lopez was convicted of
a felony under the Act. The Fifth Circuit reversed the conviction, on the
ground that the Act regulated an activity that bore no relationship to in-
terstate commerce and therefore violated the Commerce Clause.262
259 Congress made such findings in 1993, by amendment to the Act, during the pendency
of United States v. Lopez. The amendment added the following findings:
(A) Crime, particularly crime involving drugs and guns, is a pervasive, nation-
wide problem; (B) Crime at the local level is exacerbated by the interstate move-
ment of drugs, guns and criminal gangs; (C) Firearms and ammunition move easily
in interstate commerce and have been found in increasing numbers in and around
schools, as documented in numerous hearings in both the Judiciary Committee of
The House of Representatives and Judiciary Committee of the Senate;. . . (D) In
fact, even before the sale of a firearm, the gun, its component parts, ammunition, and
the raw materials from which they are made have considerably moved in interstate
commerce; (E) While criminals freely move from State to State, ordinary citizens
and foreign visitors may fear to travel to or through certain parts of the country due
to concern about violent crime and gun violence, and parents may decline to send
their children to school for the same reason; (F) The occurrence of violent crime in
school zones has resulted in a decline in the quality of education in our country; (G)
This decline in the quality of education has an adverse impact on interstate com-
merce and the foreign commerce of the United States.; (H) States, localities, and
school systems find it almost impossible to handle gun-related crime by themselves;
even States, localities, and school systems that have made strong efforts to prevent,
detect, and punish gun-related crime find their efforts unavailing due in part to the
failure or inability of other states or localities to take strong measures; and (1) Con-
gress has power under the interstate commerce clause and other provisions of the
Constitution, to enact measures to ensure the integrity and safety of the Nation's
schools by enactment of this subsection.
S. 1607, 103d Cong. (1993); H.R. 3355, 103d Cong. (1993). The findings were included in the
Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-32, 108 Stat. 1796,
which, in part, amended § 922(q) to include the findings. Before the Supreme Court in Lopez,
the government did not rely on those findings as a substitute for the absence of legislative
findings when the Gun Free School Zones Act was originally enacted. United States v. Lopez,
514 U.S. 549, 562 n.4 (1994).
260 404 U.S. 336 (1971). See supra notes 250-253 and accompanying text.
261 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
262 United States v. Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342, 1367-68 (5th Cir. 1993). The Fifth Circuit rea-
soned that "neither the Act nor its legislative history reflect any Congressional determination"
that possession of a firearm within a school zone was related in any way to interstate com-
merce. Id. at 1366. The court determined it could not assume such a relationship. Id at 1367.
The Fifth Circuit concluded that:
If Congress can thus bar firearms possession because of such a nexus to the grounds
of any public or private school, and can do so without supportive findings or legisla-
tive history, on the theory that education affects commerce, then it could also simi-
larly ban lead pencils, sneakers, Game Boys, or slide rules.
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The Supreme Court affirmed the Fifth Circuit's decision, holding
that the Act exceeded Congress' authority under the Commerce
Clause. 263 The Court noted that the Commerce Clause authorizes regula-
tion of (1) interstate commerce itself ("the use of the channels of inter-
state commerce"), (2) the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or
persons or things in interstate commerce, even if the threat comes from
intrastate activities, and (3) activities that have a "substantial relation to"
interstate commerce, i.e., those activities that substantially affect inter-
state commerce.264 The Court found that the Act did not regulate the
channels of interstate commerce or protect an instrumentality of, or a
thing in, interstate commerce. Accordingly, the Act could only be up-
held if the regulated activity (possession of a gun within 1000 feet of a
school) substantially affected interstate commerce.265
The Court then articulated three types of activities that may be
found to substantially affect interstate commerce for the purposes of the
Commerce Clause. First, it held that the economic activity being regu-
lated may itself substantially affect interstate commerce.266 Second, the
statute may define the prohibited activity in a manner that would require
proof, in each case, "that the firearm possession affects interstate com-
merce. '267 Third, the Court may simply conclude that the regulated ac-
tivity substantially affects interstate commerce, at least if Congress made
findings to that effect.2 68
The Court then decided that the Act did not meet any of these crite-
ria. First, the activity regulated by the Act-the possession of a gun in a
school zone-was not in itself an economic activity,2 69 nor was the Act
Id. at 1367 (emphasis in original). The Ninth Circuit, on the other hand, had held that the Gun-
Free School Zones Act was constitutional as a permissible regulation under the Commerce
Clause. United States v. Edwards, 13 F.3d 291 (9th Cir. 1993), vacated United States v.
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, on remand 55 F.3d 428. The Ninth Circuit held that Congress had
established in previous legislative findings that possession of firearms affects the national
economy, and the addition in § 922(q) of the condition that the firearms be possessed within
1000 feet of a school did not diminish Congress' power. If Congress can legitimately regulate
the whole of firearm possession, the court concluded, it may legitimately regulate a subset.
263 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 549.
264 Id. at 557-58. To satisfy the latter alternative, the Court noted, there must be a sub-
stantial affect on interstate commerce, rather than a mere "affect." Id. at 559.
265 Id. at 559.
266 ld.
267 Id. at 560-61. The court used the phrase "affects interstate commerce" rather than
"substantially affects interstate commerce." In context, however, the court was referring to a
statutory requirement that the firearm travel in interstate commerce, and there is no indication
that a standard less than "substantial affect" would apply.
268 1d. at 560-61. The Court did not require legislative findings, but hinted that it could
more easily reach the conclusion if such findings were present. Il
269 Id. at 560 ("The possession of a gun in a local school zone is in no sense an economic
activity that might, through repetition elsewhere, substantially affect any sort of interstate
commerce.").
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an essential part of a larger regulation of economic activity. 270 Second,
the Act did not require proof of a link between the defendant's activity
and interstate commerce.271 For example, the Act did not require that the
firearm possessed within the school zone had been transported in inter-
state commerce.272
Third, the Court found that the mere possession of guns in schools
does not have a substantial affect on interstate commerce. Congress had
not made findings to this effect in adopting the Act, and the Government
did not rely on the findings that Congress subsequently made.273 Also,
previous congressional findings that possession of firearms affected in-
terstate commerce 274 were deemed inapposite because they did not spe-
cifically address the possession of guns in schools. 275
The Court also rejected the Government's attempts to tie gun pos-
session in a school zone to interstate commerce. The Government con-
270 Id.
271 Id. at 562 (the Act "has no express jurisdictional element which might limit its reach
to a discrete set of firearm possessions that additionally have an explicit connection with or
effect on interstate commerce"). The Court thus distinguished the statute in United States v.
Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 345 (1971). Id.
272 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 562.
273 Id. at 562 n.4
274 The formal findings made by Congress in adopting the 1968 Act did show a connec-
tion between possession of firearms and interstate commerce: "Congress hereby finds and
declares that the receipt, possession, or transportation of a firearm by felons ... constitutes-
(1) a burden on commerce or threat affecting the free flow of commerce." 18 U.S.C. § 1201.
See Bass, 404 U.S. at 34546 n.14. In addition, Congress found that interstate trafficking in
firearms could not be adequately addressed without federal control over commerce in those
weapons. Pub. L. No. 90-351, § 901(a), 82 Stat. 197, 225 (1968). Once Congress finds that.an
activity affects interstate commerce, it need not make those findings anew. See Fullilove v.
Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 503 (1980) (Powell, J., concurring) ("After Congress has legislated
repeatedly in an area of national concern, its Members gain experience that may reduce the
need for fresh hearings or prolonged debate when Congress again considers action in that
area.").
275 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 563. Although the 1968 Act did not include a specific regulation of
guns in or near schools, nothing in the 1968 Act suggests that Congress believed that guns
affecting interstate commerce suddenly ceased their interstate effects when transported within
target-range of school children. Section 922(q) is a subset of legitimate federal regulation of
the possession of firearms, and is therefore premised upon Congress' understanding of the
interstate effects of the activity. See United States v. Edwards, 13 F.3d 291, 293 (9th Cir.
1993) (§ 922(q)(1)(A) does not violate the Tenth Amendment because Congress established
that possession of firearms affects the national economy, and addition of the condition in
§ 922(q), that the firearms be possessed within 1000 feet of a school does not diminish Con-
gress' power). Indeed, once a class of activities has been held to affect interstate commerce,
all subparts of that class are presumed to affect interstate commerce. See Perez v. Unites
States, 402 U.S. 146, 154 (1971) (quoting Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 193 (1968))
("Where the class of activities is regulated and that class is within the reach of the federal
power, the courts have no power to excise, as trivial, individual instances' of the class.");
United States v. McDougherty, 920 F.2d 569, 572 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 911
(1991) (holding that because "Congress has already determined, and the courts have accepted
as rational, that drug trafficking affects interstate commerce," Congress has power to enact a
statute providing harsher punishment for drug trafficking within 1,000 feet of a school).
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tended that the presence of guns in schools might result in violent crime,
that the high costs of gun violence are spread throughout the nation
through insurance costs, and that gun violence threatens the learning en-
vironment and thus adversely affects the national economy.27 6 The
Court dismissed this argument, concluding that these propositions would
justify congressional regulation of nearly anything, including subjects-
such as, for example, family law-that have traditionally been left to the
states.277 The Court further maintained that, if Congress can "regulate
activities that adversely affect the learning environment, then, afortiori,
it also can regulate the educational process directly," including determin-
ing a school's curriculum. 278
3. Federal Regulation of Guns in Schools After Lopez
After Lopez, the exact scope of permissible federal regulation of
guns in the schools under the Commerce Clause is unclear. So far, Lopez
has not had a significant impact on Commerce Clause decisions.279 This
should not be surprising, despite the flurry amongst commentators at the
Court's deciding, for the first time in decades, that Congress lacked com-
merce power to regulate. 280 Lopez did not announce a new or different
276 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 563-64.
277 Id.
278 Ld. at 565. This gratuitous conclusion is quite a stretch. There would seem to be a
reasonable distinction between the regulation of firearms, which impede the learning of any
curriculum, and the regulation of curriculum itself. See McDougherty, 920 F.2d at 572 n.2
(9th Cir. 1990) (holding that the "schoolyard statute," 21 U.S.C. § 860, which increases the
punishment for those who sell drugs within 1,000 feet of schools, does not in any way regulate
the schools themselves).
279 See, e.g., United States v. Turner, 77 F.3d 887, 888-89 (6 Cir. 1996) (§ 922(g) was
constitutional despite holding in Lopez); United States v. Rambo, 74 F.3d 948, 951 (9th Cir.
1995) (18 U.S.C. § 922(o), prohibiting transfer or possession of a machine gun if not lawfully
owned before May 19, 1986, is proper exercise of commerce power, because there could be no
unlawful possession under § 922(o) without an unlawful transfer, and thus the statute regulates
the market in weapons rather than the possession of a weapon in a specific geographical area);
United States v. Diaz-Martinez, 71 F.3d 946 (1st Cir. 1995) (18 U.S.C. § 922(k), prohibiting
transportation in interstate commerce of a firearm that has had its serial number removed or
obliterated, is lawful because it requires that the firearm be in interstate commerce); United
States v. Kirk, 70 F.3d 791 (5th Cir. 1995) (same); United States v. Wilks, 58 F.3d 1518 (10th
Cir. 1995) (same); United States v. Hanna, 55 F.3d 1456, 1462 & n.2 (9"' Cir. 1995) (holding
that Lopez did not affect Ninth Circuit's prior decision in United States v. Sherbondy, 865 F.2d
996 (9'h Cir. 1988), that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), prohibiting possession of a firearm by a felon,
was a constitutional exercise of commerce power); United States v. Presley, 52 F.3d 64, 67 (4'
Cir. 1995) ("the federal statute criminalizing the possession of a firearm by a felon does not
violate the Commerce Clause because sufficient nexus exists between the harm of firearms and
interstate concerns"); United States v. Garcia-Beltran, 890 F. Supp. 67 (D.P.R. 1995) (18
U.S.C. § 2119, federal car-jacking statute, lawful due to statutory language requiring interstate
commerce and express legislative findings on effects of caijacking on interstate commerce).
280 See, e.g., Lynn A. Baker, Conditional Federal Spending After Lopez, 95 COLuM. L.
REv. 1911 (1995); Anthony B. Ching, Travelling Down the Unsteady Path: United States v.
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test for evaluating statutes under the Commerce Clause.281 At its
broadest, Lopez requires that the nexus between the regulated activity
and interstate commerce be closer, in some unquantified sense, than what
was deemed satisfactory in prior decisions that the Court declined to
identify.282 At its narrowest, Lopez holds only that the mere possession
of a firearm within 1000 feet of a school did not have, on the record
before the Court, a substantial affect on interstate commerce. There re-
main, therefore, several avenues open for Commerce Clause regulation
of guns in schools. 28 3
First, Congress may regulate aspects of gun possession that consti-
tute independent economic activities, at least where those activities have
an interstate effect.284 For example, the sale of firearms, and perhaps
possession with intent to sell, are economic activities, and there is sub-
stantial proof that gun sales, even at school, have an interstate charac-
Lopez, New York v. Unites States & the Tenth Amendment, 29 LoYoLA L.A. L. Rav. 99
(1995).
281 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558-60. See United States v. Kirk, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 1756
(5' Cir. Feb. 3, 1997) (per curiam) ("It is important to the understanding of Lopez that the
Supreme Court intended to establish an outer limit to congressional authority, not to retreat
from well-established Commerce Clause precedent") (citing United States v. Kenney, 91 F.3d
884, 887 (7' Cir. 1996)).
Contrary to defendant's contentions, Lopez neither purports to espouse a more criti-
cal test of Congress' authority under the Commerce Clause nor implicitly overrules
prior decisions upholding the constitutionality of § 841(a)(1). . . . Instead, the
Supreme Court employed the same analysis it used previously, and rather than limit-
ing the applicability of the Commerce Clause, the Court simply declined to expand
the breadth of Congress' power to regulate under the Commerce Clause to include
the Gun Act.
United States v. Sung Jin Kim, 94 F.3d 1247, 1249 (9h Cir. 1996); see also United States v.
Paredes, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 7758 (1lth Cir. Apr. 22, 1998) (finding the evidentiary stan-
dard under 18 USC §1951(a) unchanged by Lopez) United States v. Tocco, 135 F.3d 116 (2d
Cir. 1998) ("Lopez did not elevate the government's burden in proving a nexus to interstate
commerce," where statute contains a jurisdictional element.).
282 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559-60 (holding that test is whether activity has substantial affect,
rather than mere affect, on interstate commerce); id, at 566 (noting that prior decisions, not
identified by the Court, had "taken long steps down [the] road" to a general federal police
power).
283 Federal regulation would likely be based on the assertion that the possession of guns
in or near schools has a substantial affect on interstate commerce. Theoretically, firearms
regulation could also be permissible if the statute regulated a channel or instrumentality of
interstate commerce (such as public highways or the mails). See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558-60;
United States v. Rambo, 74 F.3d 948 (9th Cir. 1996) (upholding 18 U.S.C. § 922(o) as a
regulation of channels of interstate commerce). Further, firearms may themselves be objects
in interstate commerce and subject to federal regulation. See United States v. Wilks, 58 F.3d
1518 (10th Cir. 1995) (upholding 18 U.S.C. § 922(o) as regulation of a thing in interstate
commerce).
284 Cf. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561-63.
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ter.285 Thus, Congress could regulate the sale of firearms taking place
within a school zone, as well as all sales to minors.286
Second, Congress could outlaw an activity involving a firearm in
interstate commerce.287 For example, Congress could specify as an ele-
ment of the offense that the firearm must have been transported in inter-
state commerce.288 Thus, Congress could outlaw possession of a firearm
within a school or school zone, as long as the firearm has been shipped,
received or transported in interstate commerce.
Third, Congress could demonstrate the substantial affect that guns
in and around schools have on interstate commerce, by making express
legislative findings to that effect.2 89 Congress could start by restating its
1993 findings that firearms move easily in interstate commerce, that vio-
lent crime in school zones adversely affects the quality of education and
adversely impacts interstate commerce, and that states have difficulty
handling "gun-related crime" without federal involvement due to incon-
sistencies in laws from state to state.
Legislative findings by themselves may not be sufficient.290 Lan-
guage in the Court's Lopez opinion appears to foreclose the possibility of
any finding that the mere possession of a gun within a school zone could
substantially affect interstate commerce.291 On the other hand, the Court
285 See supra notes 250-253 and accompanying text.
286 See 18 U.S.C. § 922(x) (1999) (prohibiting firearm sale to minors).
287 Cf. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561.
288 United States v. Gateward, 84 F.3d 670, 671 (3d Cir. 1996) ("We do not understand
Lopez to undercut the Bass Scarborough proposition that the jurisdictional element in or af-
fecting commerce' keeps the felon firearm law well inside the constitutional fringes of the
Commerce Clause.") See United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336 (1971); supra notes 250-253
and accompanying text. See also Scarborough v. United States, 431 U.S. 563, 575 (1977)
(conviction under federal law regulating possession of firearms that "have been, at some time,
in interstate commerce") (footnote omitted); Barrett v. U.S., 423 U.S. 212, 225 (1976) (federal
law regulating receipt of firearms "that previously had moved in interstate commerce," in-
dependent of felon's receipt).
289 Proof that the activity regulated by a federal statute substantially affects interstate
commerce does not require express legislative findings. See, e.g., Perez v. Unites States, 402
U.S. 146, 156 (1971) ("We have mentioned in detail the economic, financial and social setting
of the problem as revealed to Congress. We do so not to infer that Congress need make
particularized findings in order to legislate."); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 299
(1964) (holding that formal findings are not necessary). See also Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc.
v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 252, 258 (1964) (referring to legislative history in absence of
express findings). Nevertheless, such findings undoubtedly assist a court in determining
whether Congress did, in fact, ascertain a nexus between interstate commerce and the activity
being regulated. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 562-63.
290 Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314, 323-24 (1981) ("A court may invalidate legislation
under the Commerce Clause only if it is clear that there is no rational basis for a congressional
finding that the regulated activity affects interstate commerce, or that there is no reasonable
connection between the regulatory means selected and the asserted end.").
291 The Court concluded that "[t]he possession of a gun in a local school zone is in no
sense an economic activity that might, through repetition elsewhere, substantially affect any
sort of interstate commerce." Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567.
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did not reject the Government's arguments because there were no formal
legislative findings of a nexus with interstate commerce, but because
such a conclusion would require multiple inferences justifying regulation
of any activity.292 Indeed, the Court was apparently most troubled that
neither Congress, nor the Court, nor even the Government's lawyers
were able to identify a single activity that could not be federally regu-
lated under the Government's theory.293
One of the lessons from Lopez, therefore, is that Congress, when
adopting legislation like the Act (18 U.S.C. § 922(q)), should include
findings that clearly distinguish between regulating guns in schools and
regulating other intrastate activities traditionally left to the states. Also,
Congress should emphasize that the legislation regulates firearms, not
school curriculum. Indeed, the prohibition of guns from schools and
school zones does not dictate what children will learn, but rather better
enables them to learn whatever the states choose to teach. By the same
token, while control of the school day should remain the province of the
states, activities affecting the national interest should not become insu-
lated from federal regulation merely because they occur within 1000 feet
of a school. Thus, while the effect that guns in school have on education
is of national interest and legitimately motivates Congress to act, it is
specifically Congress' concern about interstate gun trafficking that would
justify a Gun-Free School Zones Act under the Commerce Clause.
4. Constitutionality of the Gun-Free School Zone Act
Amendments of 1995
In 1995, the Gun-Free School Zones Act294 was amended to address
the deficiencies pointed out in Lopez. The Act now requires proof that
firearms possessed within school zones have moved in interstate com-
merce. Thus, as amended, the Act prohibits the knowing possession or
discharge of a firearm within 1000 feet of a school, if the firearm trav-
elled in interstate commerce. This new jurisdictional element makes the
Act constitutional.295 In addition, the Act also includes the legislative
findings added by amendment in 1993.296 These findings may provide
292 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 549-50 ("To uphold the Government's contentions here [that
§ 922(q) is justified because firearms possession in a local school zone substantially affects
interstate commerce], we would have to pile inference upon inference in a manner that would
bid fair to convert congressional authority under the Commerce Clause to a general police
power of the sort retained by the States.").
293 Id. at 564-65.
294 18 U.S.C. § 922(q) (1999).
295 Cf. Lope4 514 U.S.at 549.
296 See supra note 259.
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another basis for a court to conclude that the regulated activity "substan-
tially affects" interstate commerce. 297
Even if the amended Act is constitutional, however, there is no
guarantee that it will deter students from taking guns to school. A Gun-
Free School Zone will deter only if there is a perception that firearms
within the zone will be detected, and violators will be punished. De-
tecting firearms within a school, where expectations of privacy are di-
minished and limited numbers of students are confined to a physical
space, is difficult enough; detecting firearms on public streets among
passers-by within a 1000-foot radius would present an even greater
challenge.
Furthermore, the Act does not provide for granting federal funds to
the states for detection or enforcement, and thus leaves it to the states to
bear the cost. While federal law enforcement could help local agencies
police school zones, the specter of FBI agents patrolling tens of
thousands of schools across the nation is as daunting as it is unrealis-
tic.298 Finally, the state's enforcement of the amended Gun Free School
Zones Act consumes resources that could otherwise be spent on meas-
ures or programs that might be better tailored to the particular circum-
stances of the school.
5. The Prohibition of Possession By and Sales to Minors
With certain exceptions, 299 § 922(x) makes it unlawful for a person
to sell, deliver or otherwise transfer a handgun or ammunition to a person
whom the transferor, knows or should know, is a minor.300 The section
also makes it unlawful for a juvenile to knowingly possess a handgun or
ammunition.30
297 But see supra notes 280 and accompanying text. As discussed above, it may not be
sufficient for Congress merely to announce that gun possession in a school zone does, in fact,
affect interstate commerce.
298 Even with this legislation, the FBI is not about to start posting its agents around
the more than 100,000 schools in this country. Primary enforcement responsibility
will remain where it is: with state and local police. But these police either have or
have not got the resources to fight this problem effectively. If it is a priority and
they have the resources, adopting this law isn't necessary; if not, adopting it won't
help.
Hearings on S. 890, supra note 126, at 89 (statement of Professor Larry Kramer).
299 Section 922(x) does not apply to temporary transfers or possession if the handgun or
possession is used in the course of employment or certain ranching or farming, the juvenile's
parent or guardian has given written permission, the juvenile is a member of the Armed
Forces, the transfer is a transfer of title by inheritance, or the juvenile takes possession of the
handgun or ammunition in defense of the juvenile or others against an intruder into a resi-
dence. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(x)(3)(A) (1999)
300 l § 922(x)(1) (1999).
301 Id. § 922(x)(2).
EFFEcrs OF GUNs
To the extent that § 922(x) regulates sales, it regulates an economic
activity that has a substantial affect on interstate commerce and, there-
fore, falls squarely within Congress' commerce power.302 To the extent
that § 922(x) regulates the mere possession of handguns, its constitution-
ality is less clear. As noted, mere possession is not an economic activ-
ity.30 3 The statute does not contain a jurisdictional element requiring
proof that the firearm travelled in interstate commerce, 30 4 nor does
§ 922(x) contain any legislative findings on the affect of juvenile gun
possession on interstate commerce. It is difficult to see how the posses-
sion of a firearm by a minor is more likely to affect interstate commerce
than the possession of a firearm within a school zone (which the Lopez
Court found was lacking sufficient effect).
Nonetheless, persuasive arguments for the constitutionality of
§ 922(x) do exist. First, congressional findings do suggest that posses-
sion of guns by juveniles affects interstate commerce. Specifically, find-
ings made in amending the Gun-Free School Zones Act reflect Congress'
understanding that juvenile gun possession involves interstate gun traf-
ficking and is often linked to gangs and drug trafficking. 30 5 Findings
made in enacting the 1968 Act express a causal connection between the
easy availability of firearms and juvenile crime.3 06 And although these
findings were not included in § 922(x), it should be unnecessary for Con-
gress to make such findings anew.30 7
Second, § 922(x)(2) is distinguishable from the Gun Free School
Zones Act. Unlike that statute, § 922(x)(2)'s scope is not limited to a
geographical area, such as a school, which is traditionally left to state
regulation.308
Third, the court could read § 922(x) so that it is, at all times, a stat-
ute regulating interstate commerce. If a juvenile is in possession of a
firearm, the firearm must have been transferred to him. If the firearm
came into the juvenile's possession after the effective date of § 922(x)
(which precludes such transfers), the possession would be a direct mani-
festation of an unlawful economic activity. Thus, the statute could be
construed to regulate not mere possession, but the gun market.3°9 This
type of regulation is permissible.310
302 See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 563-64.
303 Id. at 567.
304 kL at 561.
305 18 U.S.C. § 922(q) (1999).
306 18 U.S.C. § 1201 (1999). See supra note 274.
307 See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 503 (1980) (Powell, J., concurring).
308 Cf. United States v. Rambo, 74 F.3d 948, 951 (91 Cir. 1996).
309 Cf. id. at 952.
310 See United States v. Michael R., 90 F.3d 340 (9th Cir. 1996).
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The Ninth Circuit held in United States v. Michael R.,311 that
§ 922(x)(2) regulated the gun market and was a permissible regulation of
interstate commerce. In Michael R., the defendant argued that, under
Lopez, § 922(x)(2) had nothing to do with commerce, or any economic
enterprise. The court rejected this argument, accepting instead the Gov-
ernment's contention that § 922(x)(2) was an essential part of the over-
arching purpose of § 922(x)-to curb the underground market in
firearms and drugs. 312 The court then concluded that, read as a whole,
§ 922(x) regulates the sale, delivery and transfer of firearms and, there-
fore, affects the supply and demand of firearms. 313 Furthermore, the
court asserted that it had "no doubt" that juvenile handgun possession
"could have a substantial effect on interstate commerce," based on legis-
lative findings that the statute was enacted to help control crime by stop-
ping juveniles' commerce in handguns nationwide. 314 The court also
found that the handgun possession by a minor does implicate interstate
commerce because the manufacture of a firearm often involves materials
from multiple states. 315
It appears questionable, however, that § 922(x) will have any signif-
icant impact on the presence of guns in schools. Even if the government
could successfully deter mainstream firearms dealers from selling to mi-
nors, minors could obtain most of their guns on the street or from friends
or family members, as they often do.316 Such firearm exchange will
cease only if the law is enforced so rigorously that the risks outweigh the
perceived benefits of acquiring a gun.
In sum, both the amended Gun-Free School Zones Act and § 922(x)
are constitutional. Because of their significant effect on interstate com-
merce, Congress may regulate guns in and around schools by regulating
(1) the sale of guns within school zones and the sale of guns to minors,
(2) possession of firearms that have travelled in interstate commerce, and
(3) possession of firearms by juveniles.
However, it is unlikely that either the Gun-Free School Zones Act
or § 922(x) will materially decrease the number of guns in schools.
Although the measures increase the penalty for gun possession at school,
they will not increase the overall risk faced by the gun-toting student
unless additional resources are devoted to increase the likelihood of de-
tection and enforcement. Because the measures do not provide for such
311 Id.
312 See id. at 344.
313 Id.
314 Id.
315 Id. See also United States v. Cardoza, 914 F. Supp. 683, 687 (D. Mass. 1996) (hold-
ing that § 922(x) impacts the handgun market by excluding juvenile participation and is there-
fore constitutional under the Commerce Clause).
316 See supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text.
EFFEcrs OF GUNS
resources, the burden and exposure will fall upon the states. Furthermore,
these measures do not address peer influence, the students' perceived
need for self-protection, student self-esteem, lack of conflict resolution
skills, and other factors that motivate students to carry guns. Finally, as
noted, these federal measures may not be the best way to deter gun vio-
lence in the schools of a particular state or school district, because the
regulations will not be closely tailored to the circumstances of the partic-
ular schools.
B. SPENDING CLAUSE POWER
The Constitution gives to Congress the power to tax, to coin money,
and to "provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the
United States. '317 By this authority, Congress may give funds directly to
the states. Congress may also place conditions on the receipt of those
funds. Conditional spending is contractual in nature, whereby "in return
for federal funds, the States agree to comply with federally-imposed con-
ditions. ''318 In this way, Congress can induce states to take action that
they could not compel through direct regulation under the Commerce
Clause.319 Although Congress' power to place conditions on federal
funds is not unlimited,320 it has proven quite extensive.321
The parameters of the Spending Clause were set forth clearly in
South Dakota v. Dole.322 In Dole, South Dakota challenged a federal
statute, which conditioned a state's receipt of federal highway funds on
the state's prohibiting the purchase or public possession of alcoholic bev-
erages by a person under twenty-one years of age.323 If the state did not
enact such a law, the Secretary of Transportation withheld approximately
five percent of federal highway funds. South Dakota contended that im-
posing adoption of the statute violated the 21st Amendment, which
grants the states almost total control over the liquor distribution
system.324
317 U.S. CONST., ART. I, § 8, cl. 1.
318 South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206 (1987); United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1,
66 (1936).
319 Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1981).
320 See, e.g., Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 451 U.S. at 17 n.13 (1981); Lau v. Nichols,
414 U.S. 563, 569 (1974).
321 For example, in Oklahoma v. United States Civil Service Commission, 330 U.S. 127
(1947), the Supreme Court upheld the conditioning of loans and grants to Oklahoma for high-
way improvements on removing a member of the state's highway commission (who also hap-
pened to be chairman of the Democratic State Central Committee). It is unlikely that the
removal of a state officer could be compelled through direct regulations under the Commerce
Clause. See Albert J. Rosenthal, Conditional Federal Spending and the Constitution, 39 STAN-
F6RD L. REv. 1103 (1987).
322 483 U.S. 203 (1987).
323 23 U.S.C. §§ 158, 408(d)(3), (e)(3) (1987).
324 U.S. CONST. amend. XXI.
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Justice Rehnquist-who also penned the majority opinion in Lo-
pez-announced the opinion of the Dole Court. The Court declined to
decide the scope of the 21st Amendment, holding that the federal statute
was a valid exercise of Congress' spending power "even if Congress may
not regulate drinking ages directly. '325 The Court explained that, under
the Spending Clause, Congress may attach conditions to the acceptance
of funds to further national policy objectives, even if those objectives are
not within Congress' enumerated powers. 326 To be valid, such condi-
tional spending must be undertaken in pursuit of the general welfare (de-
ferring substantially to Congress), the condition must be stated
unambiguously, and the condition must relate to the federal interest in
particular national projects or programs.3 27 In addition, there can be no
independent constitutional bar to the conditional grant.3 28
The Court found that the federal statute met the first three condi-
tions, and that the 21st Amendment posed no "independent constitutional
bar" to the conditional grant of highway funds.329 The "independent
constitutional bar" limitation, the Court explained, does not prohibit the
"indirect achievement of objectives which Congress is not empowered to
achieve directly. '330 It merely precludes coercing the states to engage in
activities that would themselves be unconstitutional, such as invidious
discrimination or cruel and unusual punishment. 331 The Court noted that
placing a condition upon the receipt of five percent of the highway funds
a state could receive was "mild" and a proper exercise of power under
the Spending Clause.332
Dole, therefore, clearly demonstrates the distinction between Con-
gress' power to regulate under the Commerce Clause, and its power to
condition acceptance of funds under the Spending Clause. Most notably,
regulation of interstate activities is permitted under the Commerce
Clause only if the activities "substantially affect" interstate commerce.
By comparison, conditional spending is proper under the Spending
Clause if the condition merely "relates" to a federal interest. In Spending
325 Dole, 483 U.S. at 206.
326 Id. at 206-07.
327 Id. at 207-08.
328 It (citing, e.g., Lawrence Co. v. Lead-Deadwood Sch. Dist., 469 U.S. 256, 269-70
(1985)).
329 483 U.S. at 208.
330 Id. at 210.
331 Id. at 210-11.
332 Id. at 211. The states are presumed to have sufficient political power and financial
resources to be able to protect their interests from federal intrusion and reject funds condi-
tioned by unsatisfactory requirements. As federal grants to state and local governments now
approximate $100 billion and amount to what is a substantial proportion of state and local
government revenues, however, the idea that states are free to reject federal funds may not be
realistic.
1999] EFFEcrs OF GuNs
Clause analysis, the relationship between the condition and the federal
interest need not be particularly close; it is only necessary that there be
"some" relationship.333
1. The Spending Clause After Lopez
Both the Commerce Clause and the Spending Clause permit, di-
rectly or indirectly, federal intrusion into state autonomy. Thus, some
commentators believe that the Court's decision in Lopez-the first deci-
sion to strike down a statute under the Commerce Clause in decades-
could signal a narrower interpretation of the Spending Clause.334
These arguments are premised on the notion that conditional spend-
ing under the Spending Clause invades the Tenth Amendment's preser-
vation of powers to the states335 as much as direct regulation under the
Commerce Clause. In theory, a state can decline federal funds if the
conditions are too onerous or repugnant, but as a practical matter, states
are dependent on a substantial inflow of federal funds and are not likely
able to raise equivalent funds by increasing state taxes. 336 States lacking
any meaningful alternative to federal funding may be forced to submit to
the federal will. 337
These arguments, however, miss the mark. The potentially coercive
effect of the Spending Clause has not been recognized as a valid basis for
striking down Spending Clause legislation.3 38 The issue of constitution-
ality under the Spending Clause has never included a "coercion test. ' 339
333 See New York v. U.S., 505 U.S. 144, 167 (1992).
334 See, e.g., Baker, supra note 283. Baker contends that the Spending Clause should be
deemed coextensive with the Commerce Clause. She proposes that, if a Spending Clause
appropriation would regulate the states in ways that would not be permitted under the Com-
merce Clause, the appropriation should be presumed invalid unless it merely reimbursed the
states for amounts spent for a purpose specified by the bill. Under Baker's proposal, a stat-
ute-calling for reimbursement to the states for the costs of prosecuting offenders under the
state's gun-free school zone statute-would be permissible reimbursement legislation, because
it would not offer any funds beyond what is necessary to reimburse expenditures for the speci-
fied purpose. On the other hand, a statute that provides an education fund of, e.g., $100 per
student, on the condition that the state has a gun-free school zone act, would be impermissible.
335 The Tenth Amendment provides that "[t]he powers not delegated to the United States
by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or
to the people." U.S. CONST. amend. X.
336 Baker, supra note 283 at 1936-37.
337 Even in Dole, the Supreme Court acknowledged this possibility. "In some circum-
stances, the financial inducement offered by Congress might be so coercive as to pass the point
at which 'pressure turns into compulsion."' South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211 (1987).
The Court concluded that the threatened loss to states of five percent of their allotment of
federal highway funds did not pass this critical point, but did not identify the percentage that
would. Id. Provisions requiring 95% of Federal Highway Act funds to be forfeited have been
upheld. Nevada v. Skinner, 884 F.2d 445, 454 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1070
(1990).
338 Nevada v. Skinner, 884 F.2d 445 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1070 (1990).
339 State of Missouri v. U.S., 918 F. Supp. 1320, 1329 (E.D. Mo. 1996).
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In fact, the Supreme Court has suggested that an inquiry as to the coer-
cive nature of the condition would be inappropriate. 34
In any event, it is unlikely that Lopez will have an effect on Spend-
ing Clause litigation for several reasons.341 First, the Spending Clause is
a power independent from the Commerce Clause. Decades ago, in
United States v. Butler,342 the Supreme Court interpreted the Spending
Clause as authorizing the "expenditure of public moneys for public pur-
poses [which] is not limited by the direct grants of legislative power
found in the Constitution."343
Second, Spending Clause legislation does not implicate the Tenth
Amendment. The Tenth Amendment is implicated only if Congress has
"directly compelled" the state "to enact a federal regulatory program. ' '344
Even if a federal statute had a measurable impact on a particular state
program or economy that impact alone would not be sufficient to estab-
lish a Tenth Amendment violation.3 45
Third, decisions since Lopez do not reflect a narrower view of the
Spending Clause. In State of Missouri v. United States,346 the court up-
held the constitutionality of two provisions of the 1990 Amendments to
the Clean Air Act,347 despite the plaintiffs argument that Lopez indi-
cated a new interest in federalism on the part of the Supreme Court. In
Commonwealth of Virginia Dep't of Education v. Riley,348 the Fourth
Circuit upheld provisions of the Individuals with Disabilities Education
Act ("IDEA"). Under the IDEA, federal funds are provided to states to
help them educate disabled children if the states, among other things,
guarantee to all children with disabilities the right to a free appropriate
public education.
340 Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 589-90 (1937).
341 Although interesting, Baker's proposal is not persuasive. First, Baker begins with a
faulty premise. She presumes that the Spending Clause and the Commerce Clause are coex-
tensive. However, in United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1935), the Court interpreted the
Spending Clause as authorizing "expenditure of public moneysfor public purposes [which] is
not limited by the direct grants of legislative power found in the Constitution." Id. at 66. See
South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206 (1987). Second, her distinction between reimburse-
ment spending and regulatory spending may often prove illusory. Congress could simply re-
duce existing appropriations by the expected reimbursement, or, in lieu of providing increased
educational appropriations, keep existing appropriations the same and condition their
reimbursement.
342 297 U.S. 1, 66 (1935).
343 Id. at 66. See Dole, 483 U.S. at 206-07.
344 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 162 (1992).
345 Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 292 n.33
(1981).
346 918 F. Supp. 1320 (E.D. Mo. 1996).
347 Clean Air Act §§ 110, 179, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7410-7509.
348 86 F.3d 1337 (4th Cir. 1996).
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Finally, as mentioned earlier, the author of the Lopez opinion, Jus-
tice Rehnquist, was also the author of the Court's opinion in United
States v. Dole, which embraced a broad view of the Spending Clause.
Indeed, the Court's opinion in Dole makes clear the distinction between
the Commerce Clause and the Spending Clause. 349 The constitutionality
of Spending Clause legislation should, therefore, continue to turn on the
test set forth in Dole.
2. Spending Clause Power to Regulate Guns in Schools
Conditional funding may be used to regulate guns in schools. As
discussed above, conditional spending legislation will be upheld if (1) it
is undertaken in pursuit of the general welfare, (2) the conditions are not
ambiguous, (3) the conditions relate to the federal interest in making the
expenditure, and (4) the conditions do not violate any constitutional
guarantee.350 Congress' grant of funds to the states for education cer-
tainly furthers the general welfare.351 Conditioning those funds on the
states' undertaking measures to minimize the disruption caused by guns
is related to the federal interest in reducing gun violence in schools. 352
Thus, as long as the condition is stated unambiguously and does not im-
plicate an independent constitutional bar, the conditional funding should
be permitted under the Spending Clause. Under this analysis, both the
Gun-Free Schools Act of 1994353 and the Safe Schools Act of 1994354
are constitutional, although they have several shortcomings, discussed
below.
3. The Gun-Free Schools Act of 1994
The Gun-Free Schools Act of 1994 provides that, as a condition of
receiving federal education funds, each state must require its local educa-
tional agencies to expel, for at least a year, any student who brings a
firearm to school.355 The Act does permit, however, the local educa-
tional agency to decide, on an ad hoc basis, not to expel the student.356
The Act further leaves it to the states to decide whether to provide educa-
tional opportunities to the expelled student in an alternative setting.357
The Gun-Free Schools Act plainly meets the standards for Spending
Clause legislation set forth in Dole. First, the statute is undertaken in
349 South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206-07 (1987).
350 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 171-72 (1992); Dole, 483 U.S. at 207-08.
351 See supra notes 204-210 and accompanying text.
352 See supra notes 204-223 and accompanying text.
353 20 U.S.C. § 8921(b) (1994).
354 Id. §§ 5961, 5962 (1994).
355 Ild. § 8921(b).
356 Ld. § 8921(b)(1).
357 Id. § 8921(b)(2).
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pursuit of the general welfare, because both educational funding and at-
tempts to minimize disruptions in education are important to the welfare
of the nation.358 Second, the condition is set forth unambiguously, as the
statute specifically declares that "each state receiving federal funds under
this chapter shall have in effect a state law" requiring expulsion.359
Third, the condition of mandating expulsion for gun possession in
schools relates to the federal interest in providing funds for education.
Finally, the condition of mandatory expulsion does not violate any con-
stitutional guarantee. The regulation of guns in general, and the expul-
sion of students for possessing guns in particular, are rationally related to
legitimate government interests.3 60 Guns and gun violence instill fear in
students and teachers, cause truancy, and affect the ability of students to
!earn361-expulsion prevents at least the expelled student from bringing
a gun to school.
However, the Gun-Free Schools Act may actually do little to reduce
guns and gun violence in schools. The statute does not supplement state
funds or resources for either detecting students who have firearms or
administering and enforcing the expulsion requirement. Unless students
believe that expulsion can and will be enforced, they will not likely be
deterred.
Furthermore, the Gun-Free Schools Act has other shortcomings.
First, the Act leaves the states to deal with the significant ramifications
of expulsion. Unless the expelled student enrolls in a private school or is
provided an alternative school by the state, he or she will be deprived of
education for at least a year, if not more.362 Most families cannot afford
private schooling, and private schools may not welcome a student ex-
pelled for gun possession. If an alternative school is provided for ex-
pelled students, the state must expend additional funds. In either event,
the statute may merely serve to move guns from one school to another.
Second, although the statute does not prohibit the state from under-
taking other measures to combat gun violence in schools, it does discour-
age the state from doing so. The Act requires schools to expend funds to
enforce a particular punishment dictated by the federal government, at
the expense of pursuing other preventative or punitive measures, or to
lose federal educational funding in its entirety. This is truly coercive
Spending Clause legislation.363
358 See supra notes 204-210 and accompanying text.
359 20 U.S.C. § 8921(b)(1) (1994) (emphasis added).
360 See discussion supra parts II.A.1, III.A.2; See supra notes 164-171 and accompany-
ing text (discussing right to education and right to possess guns).
361 See supra notes 64-82 and accompanying text.
362 Once expelled, most students do not complete their education. See supra note 121.
363 A bill that would similarly tie the hands of state and local governments is the Violent
and Repeat Juvenile Offender Act of 1997, S.B.10, which passed the Senate Judiciary Coin-
EFFEcrs OF GuNs
4. The Safe Schools Act of 1994
The Safe Schools Act of 1994 grants up to $3,000,000 over two
years to local educational agencies demonstrating a high incidence of
juvenile violent crime. The funds may be used to conduct studies assess-
ing violence, develop strategies to combat that violence, train school per-
sonnel, conduct community education programs to promote safety and
reduce school violence, teach students conflict resolution skills and con-
duct other violence prevention activities, create "safe zones of passage"
through increased law enforcement and neighborhood patrols, educate
students and parents on the dangers of guns, counsel victims, purchase
metal detectors, hire security personnel and reimburse local law enforce-
ment personnel for participation in activities permitted under the
statute.364
The Safe Schools Act meets the criteria for Spending Clause legisla-
tion. The statute is undertaken for the general welfare in that the goal, as
expressed by Congress, is to improve safety in the educational environ-
ment.3 65 The statute identifies the condition for the funding unambigu-
ously, as the statute provides that the funds may only be spent for
designated uses.366 The uses to which the funds may be put are all re-
lated to maintaining order at school, which is related to the national inter-
est in education. Finally, the statute does not require the states to act in
violation of any constitutional guarantee.
The Safe Schools Act gives the states flexibility in dealing with
guns in schools, and is less of an affront to state autonomy than the Gun-
Free Schools Act. Rather than requiring a state to mandate expulsion or
lose federal funding, the Act provides the states with funds to allocate
among a variety of programs geared toward curbing gun violence in, and
around, schools. Based on the nature of the school district's needs and
environment, and based on input from parents and school personnel, one
school district could choose to use most of its grant on educational pro-
grams, conflict resolution programs and security personnel. Another dis-
trict, based on its circumstances, could use its grant for studies assessing
its needs, creating safe zones of passage and reimbursing local law en-
mittee in July 1997. The bill would provide $2.5 billion to state juvenile justice programs for
five years, but require recipients to: fingerprint and photograph children charged with serious
crimes, whether or not convicted, and provide the information to the FBI, schools and the
courts; drug-test juveniles in certain situations; yield jurisdiction to federal prosecutors who
would have discretion to prosecute juveniles as adults for certain offenses; allow 14-year olds
to be prosecuted as adults; and allow juveniles to be jailed in adult facilities for up to 72 hours
and incarcerate youths for truancy (in apparent contradiction with the conditions on federal
grants under the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act, 42 U.S.C. § 5601).
364 20 U.S.C. § 5965(a) (1994).
365 Id. § 5965(b).
366 Id. § 5965(a) ("A local educational agency shall use grant funds received under this
subchapter for one or more of the following activities").
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forcement. Although it is more likely that states will welcome the funds
and allocate them among permissible uses, if a state ultimately dislikes
all permissible uses of the proposed funds, it need not accept the federal
grant, and can do so without fear of losing educational funding.
The Safe Schools Act is also more likely to lead to deterrence than
the Gun-Free Schools Act. Many of the permissible uses of the funds,
such as installing metal detectors and hiring security personnel, will in-
crease the real and perceived enforcement of existing punitive measures.
Other uses of funds, such as community education programs, instruction
on conflict resolution skills, and creating safe zones of passage win de-
crease the perceived need to have a gun. Increased perceptions of en-
forcement and decreased benefits of gun possession lead to deterrence.367
And most importantly, the flexibility given to the states allows districts
to spend money on programs best designed to meet local needs.
The Safe Schools Act does not go far enough, however, because it
unduly limits the activities that the state may undertake using federal
funds. Expenditures for creating safe zones of passage, acquiring and
installing metal detectors, hiring security personnel, and reimbursing lo-
cal law enforcement for participating in school violence prevention activ-
ities, are limited in the aggregate to five percent of the grant, and those
expenditures are permitted only if there are no other federal sources of
funding.368 This is particularly problematic because the funds will be
made available only to high crime school districts, in which heightened
security and enforcement of existing measures is particularly important.
And while monies are available for counseling and conflict resolution,
studies suggest that counseling and conflict resolution skills may not be
as effective for youth living in dangerous neighborhoods.3 69
C. INCREASING THE OvERALL DEmRRENT PoTENmAL
The Gun-Free School Zones Act, the ban on sales to juveniles under
18 U.S.C. § 922(x), the Gun-Free Schools Act and the Safe Schools Act
make a powerful combination. The Gun-Free School Zones Act
criminalizes the possession of a gun within 1000 feet of a school.370
Section 922(x) criminalizes the possession of a firearm by, and the sale
of a firearm to, any juvenile.371 The Gun-Free Schools Act coerces
states to expel students who are caught with a gun at school.3 72 The Safe
Schools Act grants high crime school districts funds to use for studying
367 See supra notes 151-155 and accompanying text.
368 20 U.S.C. § 5965(b) (1994).
369 Ruttenberg, supra note 48, at 1906. But see supra note 141.
370 18 U.S.C. § 922 (q)(12)(A) (1999).
371 Ik § 922(x).
372 20 U.S.C. §8921(b) (1994).
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the problem of violence, providing education about weapons and dispute
resolution, and, to a lesser extent, for metal detectors, security, and law
enforcement.3 73 The cumulative effect of these statutes is to provide
strong penalties for taking a gun to school, and they send a strong na-
tional message that guns and schools do not mix.
However, none of these measures, with the possible exception of the
Safe Schools Act, gives the states a means of increasing the perception
that these penalties will ever be enforced. Nor do they address the stu-
dents' underlying motivations to bring guns to school, or reduce the per-
ceived need for firearms. The availability of funds for these purposes
under the Safe Schools Act is strictly limited.
Federal funding should be directed toward increasing the detection
of firearms and the likelihood of enforcement, increasing students' sense
of security, and tailoring punishment to the circumstances of the student.
First, the Safe Schools Act should be amended to give local school dis-
tricts greater flexibility in allocating federal funds to reimburse local law
enforcement, increase school security personnel, install metal detectors
and security cameras, limit access to firearms, and maintain corridors of
safe passage. The safe corridors need not correlate to the Gun Free
School Zones Act's fixed 1000-foot perimeter around the school. The
geography of the school and the typical travel routes of students to the
school may dictate that it makes more sense to establish safe corridors
along certain streets. The corridors could be secured by a combination of
school security, parent and community volunteers and local law
enforcement.
Second, the Gun Free Schools Act should be amended or interpreted
so that expulsion is not required as a condition of federal education fund-
ing.3 7 4 It may at times be inappropriate to expel a student caught with a
gun. After all, little is gained from shuttling the student from school to
school or casting him or her out of the school system and into the streets.
Instead, in some circumstances more suitable punishments would include
a brief suspension, confiscation of the firearm, mandatory classes in con-
flict resolution and the dangers of guns, parent-teacher conferences, and
community service hours.
These modifications to the Safe Schools Act and the Gun Free
Schools Act will allow the local agencies closest to the problem to evalu-
373 MdL §§ 5961, 5962.
374 There already exists the right of the local agency to decide on an ad hoc basis not to
enforce the expulsion requirement. 20 U.S.C. § 8921(b)(1) (1994). The proposal here goes
further, replacing the requirement with a number of alternative punishments, which could in-
clude expulsion in serious cases. In this way, the statute would assure that the students were
appropriately disciplined, but without a presumption of expulsion, and without the appearance
that a statutory punishment was being disregarded. The goal is not to condone gun possession
at school, but to maximize deterrence.
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ate and respond to gun possession in schools. 375 They will thereby both
increase the likelihood of deterrence and strike a community balance be-
tween deterrence and social utility.3 7 6
CONCLUSION
There is no law, and no tolerable degree of enforcement, that will
magically whisk away the problem of guns and violence in our nation's
schools. Some of the more popularized tragedies, in which children
brought family guns to school and killed classmates and teachers, would
not have been prevented by a new law or harsher punishment. To be
sure, gun violence is symptomatic of more profound societal ills, includ-
ing increasingly disaffected youth, the media's glorification of guns and
violence, and juveniles' easy access to guns. Yet state and federal gov-
ernment must join forces to curb this problem that has such demonstrable
adverse effects on children, education, and the national economy.
Deterrence will occur only if the risk of adverse consequences out-
weighs the perceived benefits of taking a gun to school. To increase the
375 Other federal legislation provides block grants to states relating to juvenile crime. The
Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act, 42 U.S.C. § 5601(1999), provides grants to
states, local governments and private organizations for development of education, prevention,
treatment and rehabilitation programs targeting juvenile delinquency and improving the juve-
nile justice system. 42 U.S.C. § 5631(1999). To receive funding, the state must submit a
three-year plan providing for coordination with local government and private agencies, an
analysis of juvenile crime problems, and juvenile justice and delinquency prevention needs,
goals and services to be provided. Id. § 5633. At least 75% of the funds must be used for a
variety of programs, including community-based alternatives to incarceration, programs to
strengthen families, delinquency prevention and educational programs, job training and liter-
acy programs. Id. § 5633(a)(10). States lose the funding if they fail to comply with certain
restrictions on the incarceration of juveniles, such as jailing juveniles for offenses that would
not be criminal if committed by an adult. Id. § 5633(a)(12).
For fiscal year 1998 Congress created a new $250 million Juvenile Accountability Incen-
tive Block Program. See Juvenile Accountability Incentive Block Program (visited April 27,
1998) <www.ojp.usdoj.gov/ocpa/NewAct/ja.htm.> States may use the funds for certain enu-
merated purposes, including constructing and operating juvenile detention and correction facil-
ities, creating and administering accountability-based sanctions for juvenile offenders, hiring
additional juvenile court personnel, establishing court-based juvenile justice programs that tar-
get young firearm offenders through the establishment of juvenile gun courts for juvenile fire-
arms offenders, and programs that enable the court system, schools and social services
agencies to address serious juvenile offenders. Id. At least 45% of the funds must be used for
court programs, and at least 35% must be used for detention and correction facilities, other
sanctions for juvenile offenders, and information sharing among courts, schools and social
service agencies. Id. To be eligible, states must certify that they are actively considering or
will consider accountability-based reforms, including adult prosecution of violent juveniles
and juvenile record reforms. Id. States must also have a plan for reducing juvenile crime and
a policy of testing appropriate categories of juveniles for use of controlled substances. Id.
376 See Hearings on S. 890, supra note 126 (statement of Jerry Kilgore, Secretary of
Schools, Commonwealth of Virginia) ("A more productive step to help states and localities
keep guns out of their schools would be a loosening of the strings attached to things like
federal gun free schools zone acts-providing a block grant approach to allow each state to
address its problem in its own individualized manner.").
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risk of adverse consequences, we must convince students not only that
carrying a gun to school is unlawful, but also that guns will be detected
and penalties will be enforced. To decrease the perceived benefit of car-
rying a gun, we must show students that guns are not necessary for pro-
tection or self-esteem. While the family plays a critical role in this task,
much of the burden of devising and implementing these deterrent meas-
ures falls on the state government and local school districts. States
plainly have the right to regulate guns in schools because of their tradi-
tional purview over education and their police power. They should also
know what deterrent measures would best fit the needs of their commu-
nities. State and local governments, however, often lack the resources to
accomplish implementation. In light of the effects of school violence on
national productivity and the national economy, the federal government
has a significant interest in assisting the states to curb gun violence in
schools.
Despite the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Lopez, the
federal government may still regulate gun sales and the possession of
firearms transported in interstate commerce. The amended Gun Free
School Zones Act, prohibiting the possession within a school zone of
guns that have travelled in interstate commerce, and the ban of 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(x) on sales to minors, are likely within Congress' Commerce
Clause power. These measures may not be effective, however, because
they focus on punishment, rather than enforcement and student motiva-
tions. They also give local agencies no assistance with, or flexibility in,
implementation and enforcement.
Indirect federal regulation under the Spending Clause provides
states with funds as long as they adhere to certain criteria. Because
Spending Clause legislation gives school districts greater leeway in allo-
cating federal funds to meet the needs of the district, it provides the
greater potential for deterrence. The Gun-Free Schools Act, which con-
ditions education funds on states requiring expulsion of students who
carry guns to school, and the Safe Schools Act, which grants funds to
schools to be spent on various programs designed to make schools safer,
are valid exercises of the Spending Clause power. Both of them address
one of the causes of gun violence-the availability of guns to youth.
Still, the Gun-Free Schools Act and the Safe Schools Act are not the
total answer. The expulsion requirement of the Gun-Free Schools Act
will either not be enforced (undermining deterrence) or will deprive stu-
dents of needed education. Although the Safe Schools Act provides
greater flexibility to the states, it strictly limits the amount that can be
spent on measures critical to detection and enforcement. The Safe
Schools Act should be broadened to allow schools to spend a greater
proportion of federal funds on law enforcement, security personnel, cor-
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ridors of safe passage, and other means of increasing the likelihood of
detecting firearms. This will increase the perceived risk of taking guns
to school and decrease the perceived need to carry a gun for self-protec-
tion. Combined with programs teaching conflict resolution skills, instil-
ling self-esteem and respect for others, and otherwise further decreasing
the perceived need to carry a gun to the classroom, these measures will
increase the likelihood of deterrence.
